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 This thesis examines President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy and his 
administration’s campaign to promote the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties from 
1977 to 1978. I argue that President Carter’s administration developed a coherent foreign 
policy vision that was inspired by moral convictions and aimed to promote international 
peace. The fundamental aspects of this vision are reflected in the Panama Canal treaties. 
During the turbulent Senate debate over the treaties, opposition arguments attacking 
President Carter’s moral policy encouraged the Carter administration to favor more 
pragmatic arguments in support of the treaties, which ultimately obscured President 
Carter’s overarching foreign policy vision. This study demonstrates how the efforts of a 
single president can significantly change the direction of American foreign policy, yet 
also reveals the tentative nature of such changes.  
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
President Jimmy Carter has recognized the Panama Canal treaties as one of his 
greatest accomplishments, but also identified the campaign for Senate ratification of these 
treaties as the greatest challenge he faced during his presidency. The two treaties were 
signed on September 7, 1977 and ratified by a single vote margin after months of fierce 
debate in the spring of 1978. The Neutrality Treaty established permanent neutrality of 
the waterway, guaranteed American vessels priority passage through the canal during 
potential emergencies, and gave the United States the indefinite right to defend the canal 
from external threats. The second treaty, often referred to as the Panama Canal Treaty, 
scheduled the transfer of the canal from U.S. to Panamanian control after, December 31, 
1999. As one of President Carter’s first foreign policy initiatives, the treaties provide 
insight into President Carter’s foreign policy vision. Historians often characterize the 
foreign policy of the Carter administration as moralistic and focused on human rights. 
What were the foundations of Carter’s foreign policy vision and just how was this vision 
reflected in the Panama Canal treaties?1 
Historians have long recognized the distinctly moral character of President 
Carter’s foreign policy objectives. While the exact foundations of individual morality are 
difficult to describe, scholars have identified some of the factors that inspired President 
                                                          1 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010), 30.  
2  
Carter’s moralistic foreign policy. Historian Gaddis Smith argues that President Carter’s 
position as a Washington outsider heightened his concern for morality. 
Coming into Washington as the former governor of Georgia made Carter more 
critical of the foreign policy decisions previous presidents had made. Carter planned to 
restore morality into national politics. Gaddis Smith also credits President Carter’s 
religious beliefs for inspiring his moral foreign policy agenda. Although, he does not take 
on the task of identifying precisely what President Carter’s foreign policy vision 
included; instead Smith describes how President Carter’s foreign policy changed over 
time. Such an emphasis on change may suggest a lack of any overarching vision, or 
perhaps the failure to communicate and achieve such a vision.2  
Likewise, historians who have focused on the Panama Canal treaties as a specific 
policy initiative have not connected it to President Carter’s moral foreign policy, which 
sought to emphasize human rights. David Skidmore, while conceding that Carter 
demonstrated “surprisingly sophisticated political skills,” argues Carter’s motivation for 
pursing the Panama treaties was largely pragmatic rather than moral. Skidmore 
emphasized Carter’s national security interests related to the Canal treaties, without 
noting that the promotion of peace is often both pragmatic and moral. Historians such as 
Adam Clymer have detailed how the Panama Canal treaties encouraged the rise of the 
ultra-conservative “New Right,” led by Ronald Reagan. However, Clymer does not 
specifically address how treaty opponents were able to gain political momentum while 
also undermining the foreign policy vision of the Carter administration. He focuses 
                                                          2 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 27.  
3  
specifically on the opposition rather than examining Carter’s promotion of the Panama 
Canal treaties. Studying the rhetoric used within the debate over the treaties demonstrates 
that treaty opponents were able to effectively counter the arguments President Carter 
made in support of the treaties. Yet another view of the treaty is presented by Walter 
LaFeber, who framed the treaty debate as a historical crisis and concluded the United 
States was economically motivated to settle the canal dispute with Panama in an effort to 
develop stronger and more profitable trade relations with all of Latin America. While 
President Carter did discuss the mutual economic benefits derived from the treaties, 
economics were not the president’s primary concern. He was more focused on the treaties 
representing a new direction for U.S. foreign policy and doing what was morally right.3 
 There seems to be historical consensus that Carter’s foreign policy was 
ultimately unsuccessful. The most common criticism made about this policy is that it 
lacked coherence. Historian Daniel Sargent argued that the Carter administration did not 
recognize the limitations of human rights policy. He conceded however that Carter’s 
interest in promoting human rights and responding to an increasingly integrated world 
was “a significant and constructive agenda.” Sociologist and Carter biographer Kenneth 
Morris argued that the president’s commitment to democratic and transparent decision-
making was simply a processes lacking an end goal. He concluded, “Carter set the stage 
for failing in his key objective: rekindling a national faith, by definition, requires an 
articulation of the final hope.” However, just because a policy fails, does not necessarily 
                                                          3 David Skidmore, “Foreign Policy Interest Groups and Presidential Power: Jimmy Carter and the Battle Over Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 478.; Adam Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence, KS: U. Press of Kansas, 2008).; Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
4  
mean it was incoherent to begin with. President Carter certainly had a final hope: to 
promote world peace.4 
Kenneth Morris was also critical of the Carter administration, arguing that it 
sought to an address a “litany of discrete issues” which “cohered around no central theme 
and unveiled no vision of what the nation might become.” This thesis demonstrates that 
one of Carter’s first foreign policy initiatives—the negotiation of the Panama Canal 
treaties—did in fact embody a clear vision. Gaddis Smith notes that Carter’s foreign 
policy reflects a time when “a fundamental debate about how the United States should 
behave in international affairs was waged with unusual clarity.” Certainly Carter’s 
foreign policy reflects different principles and values than the those of his predecessors 
which so often reflected Cold War concerns. Careful consideration of Carter’s foreign 
policy rhetoric demonstrates that President Carter’s fundamental foreign policy goals 
were originally quite clear. President Carter aimed for the U.S. to take on a leadership 
role within a peaceful and cooperative international system.5 
Historiographical considerations are difficult when studying an even as recent as 
the Panama Canal treaty debate. Many of the people who have documented this history 
were somehow involved in the negotiations, which presents a unique historical challenge. 
George D. Moffett, for instance, served as the Director of Research for the Committee of 
Americans for the Canal Treaties. William J. Jordan, author of the detailed narrative 
history entitled The Panama Odyssey, served as ambassador to Panama. Cyrus Vance 
                                                          4 Daniel Sargent, A Super Power Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Policy in the 1970s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 11.; Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens, GA: U. of Georgia Press, 1996), 223. 
5 Morris, Jimmy Carter, 223.; Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 3. 
5  
also had personal experience in Panama. When he worked as Secretary of the Army, 
President Johnson instructed him to go to Panama to help restore order and improve 
relations in the wake of the 1964 riots. Robert Pastor also served as a National Security 
Council staffer and as the Director of Latin American Affairs for the Carter 
administration. He has written extensively about American foreign policy in Latin 
America and often uses his own personal recollections of events rather than documents as 
sources. Certainly all of these people, in an effort to serve the president, had a vested 
interest in treaty ratification. Carefully scrutinizing their historical interpretations is all 
the more important due to their personal interest in the topic being studied. 
Jimmy Carter’s concern for human rights is a topic of much interest to historians. 
Human right are widely viewed as a fundamental component of Carter’s foreign policy. 
Morris notes how President Carter sought to “link foreign policy to racial equality,” by 
equating the American commitment to civil rights with the need to also commit to global 
human rights. Professor of politics Robert Strong expands on this idea. He explains how 
President Carter’s personal experience living in the South and witnessing an end to 
segregation encouraged him to strive for equality and understand the potential for 
dramatic social change. While some scholars recognized that President Carter was unique 
in developing moral foreign policy, Strong noted that many of Carter’s policies were 
simply continuations of past efforts. Strong explains that Carter’s lack of foreign policy 
experience encouraged him to adopt policies of his predecessors, including Presidents 
Nixon and Ford. The Panama treaties are one example of an inherited initiative that the 
Carter administration enthusiastically adopted because the issue aligned so closely with 
President Carter’s foreign policy vision. Evaluating the Panama Canal treaties helps to 
6  
further elucidate President Carter’s moralistic foreign policy motives and provide insights 
into his foreign policy vision.6 
In regard to human rights, political scientist Kathryn Sikkink does not 
characterize Jimmy Carter’s policy as a failure. In fact, she argues that since Carter’s 
presidency, “human rights issues, long seen as moral concerns inappropriate for foreign 
policy, have become an integral part of U.S. policy and of international and regional 
institutions.” Sikkink notes that President Carter’s foreign policy contrasted sharply with 
the Cold War, anticommunist, policy of his predecessors. His foreign policy vision was 
certainly unique and produced positive results in Latin America, although as Sikkink 
points out, Carter’s human rights policy sent “mixed signals,” to the leaders and people of 
Latin American nations. In contrast to Sikkink’s positive assessment, Joe Renourad’s 
recent study of human rights foreign policy concludes that Carter’s human rights policy, 
and multilateral efforts in particular were “largely unsuccessful,” and even argues that the 
Panama Canal treaties got in the way of Carter pursuing ratification of human rights 
covenants. President Carter had to prioritize his public policies. Choosing to pursue the 
ratification of the Panama Canal treaties rather than the human rights covenants, may 
suggest that the treaties were more closely aligned with his ideals. The fact that the 
Panama Canal treaties were the first issue the Carter administration sought to tackle is 
indicative of their importance.7 
                                                          6 Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2000) 13.; Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 263-4. 
7 Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004): 208.; Joe Renouard, Human Rights in American Foreign Policy: From the 1960s to the Soviet Collapse, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016): 165. 
7  
When outlining why the Carter administration decided to pursue the Panama 
Canal treaties as one of its first foreign policy initiatives, historians including Gaddis 
Smith have recognized as the administration did, that the issue was key to relations with 
all of Latin America. Kenneth Morris explains that President Carter had a strong desire to 
internationalize foreign policy, shifting away from Cold War policy to expand U.S. 
engagement with the rest of the world. Negotiating new treaties with Panama allowed 
President Carter to demonstrate his broad international interests. Morris also recognized 
that the Carter administration could not have accurately anticipated the extreme 
congressional opposition the Panama Canal treaties generated. Perhaps this is the case, as 
President Carter certainly believed the issue was a bipartisan one. After all, four previous 
administrations had worked to reach a new agreement with Panama. Nonetheless, 
President Carter was aware of the congressional opposition that President Ford faced 
when he had pursued negotiations with Panama. Thirty-two senators, led by Republican 
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, had even signed a resolution in opposition to new 
treaties in March of 1974. The Panama Canal continued to be a contentious topic during 
the 1976 Republican primaries when Ronald Reagan challenged Republican incumbent 
President Ford for the party’s presidential nomination. President Carter knew he would 
face strong opposition to the treaties, but he certainly underestimated just how much 
opposition he would have to overcome. Despite obstacles, President Carter committed his 
administration to pursuing negotiation and ratification of the canal treaties. Morris rightly 
concluded that “to at least some extent Carter purposely picked the fight over the canal in 
order to dramatize his new philosophy of foreign policy.” The canal issue was an 
8  
absolutely vital issue in Latin American relations and certainly reflected a new U.S. 
foreign policy approach.8 
It is hard to identify the nadir of relations between the United States and Latin 
America in the twentieth century. The U.S. certainly had a long history of involvement in 
the region, dating back to before Teddy Roosevelt built the Panama Canal and pursued 
“Big Stick” diplomacy throughout the region. William Howard Taft’s subsequent “Dollar 
Diplomacy” used economic loans to less overtly influence Latin American regimes. 
President Carter’s predecessors had failed to improve relations between the U.S. and 
Latin American countries. Historians note that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
were at the very least guilt of ignoring Latin America, focusing their attention on the 
Soviet Union. The Nixon and Ford administrations, in collaboration with their Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger, paid all too much attention to potential communist threats 
within the region. Fear encouraged the pursuit of containment policy in Latin America, 
which encouraged United States covert action to inspire regime change and influence 
policy. Such actions often encouraged or even brought to power oppressive military 
dictatorships. 
The negotiation of new Panama Canal treaties was exceedingly controversial. 
Robert Pastor summarized President Carter’s perspective of this “watershed event,” 
stating that Carter “recognized that the protection of U.S. interest in an open, efficient 
canal required a change in U.S. strategy and a new partnership based on respect rather 
than a relationship of dominance based on power.” Not only did President Carter believe 
                                                          8 Morris, Jimmy Carter, 264.; “32 Senators Back Resolution Opposing Panama Canal Pact,” New York Times, Mar 30, 1974, 3.; Strong, Working in the World, 73. 
9  
new treaties were imperative, he believed the relationship that existed between the U.S. 
and Panama needed to be repaired. He envisioned the U.S. taking on a leadership role 
within an international system that reflected American moral and democratic principles.  9 
Historians disagree as to whether the successful ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties resulted in the outcomes the Carter administration had predicted and to what 
degree the treaties should be considered a success. Laurence Shoup sharply criticized this 
foreign policy initiative, arguing that it did not go far enough to improve the unequal 
relationship between the U.S. and Panama. According to Shoup, the treaties replaced an 
imperialistic relationship with a neocolonial one that would continue to influence Panama 
politically and economically, “backed by threat of force.” Such an assessment does not 
reflect the reality that the Panama treaties embodied the moral and political values 
President Carter deemed essential. The final new agreement with Panama did not produce 
immediate dramatic results, seeing as the canal was not turned over from the U.S. to 
Panama until 1999. The treaties still reflected President Carter’s morally inspired foreign 
policy. Gaddis Smith argued the Panama treaties did not produce positive outcomes 
throughout Latin America or for the Carter administration politically. Carter was not 
specifically concerned about these consequences.  He supported the Panama Canal 
treaties because he believed it was the right thing to do. While he hoped the treaties 
would have positive effects throughout Latin America, his concern about his political 
future was limited. Michael Hogan’s research supports my conclusion that President 
                                                          9 Robert A. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 12.  
10  
Carter’s respect for American democratic and moral ideals encouraged him to prioritize 
the Panama Canal treaties.10 
Ultimately, President Carter chose to pursue new canal treaties “with 
enthusiasm,” because they embodied his moral and political values. President Carter’s 
foreign policy philosophy is often characterized as “liberal internationalism.” This 
ideology emphasizes American moral values, diplomacy, and the promotion of 
international human rights to maintain security. While historians have examined 
President Carter's foreign policy, there has been little detailed analysis of whether 
individual foreign policy issues reflect a coherent foreign policy vision. What did 
President Carter aim to achieve through his foreign policy? Studying the Panama Canal 
treaties demonstrates that his administration did develop a clear, yet complex, foreign 
policy vision, embodied within the Panama Canal treaty issue. Not only was his vision 
coherent, it also represented a dramatic departure from the Cold War policies of the past, 
especially when considering relations with the developing world and Latin America.11  
 While historians have described the characteristics of President Carter’s foreign 
policy in more general terms, they have not analyzed how the Panama Canal treaties 
specifically reflect President Carter’s foreign policy vision. What were the foundational 
beliefs that inspired Carter to fight for ratification of the treaties so ardently? It seems that 
historians have underestimated the extent that President Carter sought to emphasize 
                                                          10 Laurence Shoup, Carter Presidency and Beyond, (Palo Alto, CA: Ramparts Press, 1980): 140.; Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 132.; J. Michael Hogan, The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1861): 3. 11 Morris, Jimmy Carter, 263-4; George D. Moffett III, The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 20, Moffett discusses the fundamental ideas associated with liberal internationalism.  
11  
America's moral leadership through the negotiation and ratification of the Panama Canal 
treaties. The Panama Canal treaties not only helped to correct what the Carter 
administration characterized as a historical injustice, but Carter also hoped to set a new 
precedent for the conduct of American foreign policy. The U.S. would promote 
international peace and justice through its diplomatic efforts. 
When considering the case of the Panama Canal treaties, it is clear that moral 
concerns motivated President Carter’s foreign. His vision of international relations 
demanded America's moral democratic leadership, which required honesty and 
transparency in government, respect for the sovereignty of other countries, the promotion 
of human rights, and international cooperation in order to create a just and peaceful 
international system. The president believed peace could be reached through diplomatic 
efforts and made maintaining peace and security his highest priority. Carter signed the 
Panama Canal treaties and campaigned for their ratification in the Senate because he 
believed the treaties advanced his foreign policy vision. While the Panama Canal treaties 
are not often associated with President Carter’s human rights policy, they did in fact 
further the protection of such rights. Ultimately however, the president’s foreign policy 
vision did not gain public support due to the way in which the treaty debate was framed. 
Not only did opponents successfully obscure the President’s message, but the Carter 
administration also failed to communicate its foreign policy vision in a clear and 
consistent manner during the treaty debate. The Carter administration often ignored the 
contradictions between ideals and political realities while treaty opponents challenged 
President Carter’s credibility and commitment to human rights. 
12  
This thesis suggests two arguments contrary to common historical consensus.  
First, the Panama Canal treaties can be viewed as a policy reflective of President Carter’s 
moral foreign policy, and even as a policy that furthered human rights due to provisions 
that helped promote political self-determination, as well as economic and civil rights. 
Second, the treaties demonstrate that President Carter did indeed develop a coherent 
foreign policy vision, which he continued to work toward even after his presidency. 
While scholars have studied the Panama Canal treaties and noted that they changed the 
direction of American foreign policy, none have examined how the arguments made 
during the Panama Canal debate weakened the President’s ability to communicate his 
overarching foreign policy vision. Following this introduction, this thesis is divided into 
three additional chapters followed by a conclusion. Chapter two outlines President Jimmy 
Carter’s foreign policy vision based upon his speeches, diary entries, and correspondence 
within his cabinet. Chapter three connects the Carter administration’s overarching foreign 
policy vision to the principles of the Panama Canal treaties. Chapter four explains how 
the treaty debate ultimately undermined President Carter’s foreign policy vision. Finally, 
Chapter five concludes this study with a discussion of the historical significance and 
implications of President Carter’s foreign policy vision and the Panama Canal treaty 
debate.   
13  
 
  
CHAPTER II 
DEFINING A VISION: PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER’S FOREIGN POLICY 
When he first announced his presidential candidacy, Jimmy Carter believed that 
the government was plagued by “an absence of executive vision and direction.” Upon his 
election, he intended to solve this problem. Carter’s experience as Governor of Georgia 
did not exactly provide him much foreign policy experience, thus he emphasized the 
experience he did have, his service on the Trilateral Trade Commission. With such scant 
experience though, he could not claim to have developed a coherent foreign policy vision 
prior to his election. By the time he was inaugurated though Carter had taken many steps 
toward developing a specific foreign policy framework. He collaborated with his future 
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and ordered government agencies carry out numerous 
studies so he could become better informed about foreign policy issues.12 
In his inaugural address on January 20, 1977, President Carter described his 
foreign policy vision. He stressed “there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for 
America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and 
peaceful world that is truly humane.” From his first day in office, President Carter’s 
moral foreign policy goals were his highest priority. Considering its consistency and 
principled foundation, it seems President Carter’s rhetoric appears to genuinely reflect his 
                                                          12 Quoted in Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1977-1980 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), I: 2 (hereafter FRUS, with appropriate year, volume, and page numbers).  
14  
beliefs, values, and goals. The president called for “nothing less than a sustained 
architectural effort to shape an international framework for peace within which our own 
ideals gradually can become a global reality.” The ideals he identified as uniquely 
American “basic moral and philosophical principles” were the founding principles of the 
United States: an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Cyrus 
Vance spoke about “harnessing the basic values of the Founding Fathers to our foreign 
policy,” and noted that “historically, our country has been a force for progress in human 
affairs.” In addition to individual rights, Jimmy Carter believed the fundamental 
principles of American government included democracy—the idea that power is derived 
from the consent of the governed—as well as justice, or the rule of law, and equality, or 
equal protection under the law. He reveled his faith in the universality of American 
values when he quoted the revolutionary, Thomas Paine. Paine judged “that the cause of 
America is the cause of all mankind.” President Carter certainly hoped to make it so.13 
The president outlined his administration’s foreign policy principles early in his 
term. His campaign rhetoric even reflected his moral principles, as did his presidential 
diary entries, his public addresses, and communication among the members of his 
cabinet. The members of President Carter’s cabinet supported his vision. Historian Scott 
Kaufman argues that disagreement within President Carter’s cabinet resulted in the 
pursuit of “contradictory and inconsistent policies.” These disagreements however did 
not develop immediately after Carter took office. Even after he subsequently resigned, 
                                                          13 Remarks by Jimmy Carter, 15 March 1976, FRUS, 1977-1980, I: 16.; Vance, Hard Choices, 29.; Jimmy Carter, “Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, January 20, 1977,” in Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, Book I—January 20 to June 24, 1977, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 3 (hereafter Public Papers, with appropriate year, book, and page numbers).  
15  
Secretary of State Vance reflected upon the fact that “we agreed philosophically about 
the main elements of a fresh approach to foreign policy.” Vance, along with Vice 
President Walter Mondale, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski each worked toward clarifying and achieving President 
Carter’s foreign policy vision, which was ultimately reflected in the Panama Canal 
treaties.14 
Carter worked closely with his cabinet members. During the early months of his 
presidency and throughout the treaty debate, there was cooperation and agreement within 
the Carter administration. It was only after the Panama Canal treaties were ratified that a 
“source of confusion” arose between Vance and Brzezinski. Vance explained that 
tensions grew because Brzezinski often assumed “the role of policy spokesman,” which 
was a role Vance believed he should have held himself as the Secretary of State. Cyrus 
Vance decided to resign his position as Secretary of State in April of 1980, nearly two 
years after the Panama Canal treaties were ratified. During the Senate debate over the 
treaties the Carter administration was united in pursuing treaty ratification. Less than a 
month after his 1977 inauguration, Carter spoke before State Department officials and 
said, “I can tell you in the most accurate way that there is no disharmony. We have open, 
and frank discussions.” Vance described relations within the cabinet as “collegial,” and 
noted the “relative absence of interdepartmental jealousies.” He respected the president, 
noting he was “highly intelligent and had firm principles.” Vance explained that “there 
was broad agreement among the president and his principal advisors on the main outlines 
                                                          14 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration, (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008): 4.; Vance, Hard Choices, 29. 
16  
of our policy.” This study therefore, considers the Carter administration and executive 
branch officials as a united force, working toward the same foreign policy vision and the 
ratification of the Panama Canal treaties.15 
Morality and History 
President Carter believed his administration’s foreign policy decisions should be 
guided by basic moral principles. He also thought individual morality and national 
morality were inextricably linked and that nations, like individuals, should follow a 
specific set of moral standards. Carter promised he would not “do anything as President 
that would be a contravention of the moral and ethical standards that I would exemplify 
in my own life as an individual.” Carter believed foreign policy decisions should follow 
the “do unto others as you would have them do unto you,”— his paraphrase of Matthew 
7:12. Again, this principle suggests his belief that countries, like individuals must follow 
a set of moral values. Instead of basing foreign policy decisions on calculations of 
military strength, estimations of resources or other diplomatic concerns, using the golden 
rule to guide foreign policy suggests Carter believed countries should be diplomatically 
engaged and cooperate on equal terms.16 
Carter also derived many of his political values from history. The past inspired 
him to conclude that the American people were exceptionally capable of acting according 
to democratic principles. Other scholars have recognized this quality in Carter’s foreign 
policy as well. Kenneth Morris described how Carter maintained a “populist faith in the 
                                                          15 Vance, Hard Choices, 37-8.; “Department of State – Remarks and a Q & A Session with Dept. Employees,” February 16, 1977, Public Papers, 1977, Book I, 236.; Vance, Hard Choices, 33,38. 
16 Quoted in Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 29.; “Interview by John Hart, NBC News,” March 28, 1976, in Wesley G. Pippert ed., The Spiritual Journey of Jimmy Carter In His Own Words,(New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1978), 101. 
17  
people to make the right moral decisions if only the decision-making process is an open 
one.” Not only was Carter committed to acting according to his moral principles, he also 
believed unequivocally that democratic government was ideal and he sought to further 
democratic goals and values through his foreign policy.17 
Once elected, President Carter aimed to correct past foreign policy errors. He 
spoke at length about the immoral foreign policy pursuits of past administrations. Vance 
too recognized a “progressive erosion of our countries’ relations,” prior to Carter’s 
election. The president understood that recent American foreign policy had damaged the 
credibility of the American government and he sought to improve the international 
reputation of the United States. Carter was open and honest about what he believed to be 
errors the U.S. committed in the past. He voiced his concerns about the dishonesty of past 
administrations, and specifically criticized past administrations for the Watergate scandal, 
the Vietnam War, and ill-advised, if not criminal U.S. covert actions. He spoke of “the 
tragedy of American involvement in Vietnam,” and one of the first actions he took as 
president was to pardon draft evaders. Carter sought to reform a political system he 
believed was previously damaged by past immoral policies.18  
The President’s deep religious convictions likely inspired his belief in the value of 
repentance. President Carter was a devout born-again Christian, and often spoke of his 
faith guiding him in politics. He taught Bible classes and frequently spoke of how he 
practiced his faith. In a speech before a Bible class in Georgia before his election, he 
explained, “I pray every day that I don’t disappoint you or do anything that will make 
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you ashamed.” He even used religious language when asked whether he believed the 
president was responsible for correcting errors the U.S. committed in the past. President 
Carter matter-of-factly stated, “obviously, if I see a sinful act or an improper or heartless 
act being carried out by our nation in the past or present or future, it is my responsibility 
as president to stop that action and to atone through action for inequities or suffering that 
has been caused by it.” President Carter felt he had a moral obligation to not only 
promote just foreign policy, but to also remediate problems stemming from past immoral 
policies. The negotiation of the Panama Canal treaties allowed Carter to correct a policy 
problem of the past that he believed conflicted with U.S. values. In order to do so, the 
Carter administration outlined the fundamental democratic principles that the 
administration sought to promote.19 
The president was also concerned about past unlawful covert actions carried out 
by U.S. intelligence agencies. Prior to serving as President Carter’s Vice President, 
Walter Mondale served as a senator from Minnesota. In the Senate, Mondale had served 
on the Church Committee, which was tasked with investigating “illegal, improper, or 
unethical activities,” carried about by the CIA or other Federal agencies. The committee 
issued its final critical report in April of 1976. The report demanded there be 
congressional oversight of intelligence activities, and made public many “illegal, 
improper, and unwise acts” carried out by the CIA, including assassination plots, covert 
operations aimed at overthrowing a democratic regime, drug testing on American 
citizens, domestic spying, and blackmail attempts aimed at civil right leaders. President 
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Carter was well aware of all of these findings and upon taking office sought to reform the 
American intelligence community.20 
Historical redemption was important to Carter because he sincerely wanted to 
improve the reputation of the U.S. He knew that past policies and preemptive efforts to 
curb conflict with the Soviet Union had encouraged the U.S. to enter conflicts that he 
viewed as immoral. Carter’s cabinet supported his efforts. Vice President Walter 
Mondale spoke regretfully about how Americans “became absorbed in the narrower 
struggle against communism, and in the process supported and ultimately overcommitted 
ourselves to some of the most outrageously oppressive regimes in the world.” The 
president’s new foreign policy would be dramatically different from the Cold War policy 
of his predecessors. Carter encouraged the American public to aid his efforts to reorient 
American foreign policy. He recognized that the U.S. should work “to restore the 
historical vision of decency and honesty and truth and principle to our country.” He was 
willing to go to great lengths to make sure that the United States followed through with 
this “great responsibility.”21 
Democratic Ideals 
President Carter believed foreign policy should reflect democratic ideals and 
principles. He explained that despite past government errors, Americans have “got the 
best system of government on Earth.” His commitment to democracy was unwavering. 
He sincerely believed that despite the large size of the federal government, it should still 
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be accountable to the American public. He also recognized that the Chief Executive 
should work collaboratively with Congress and sought to increase communication 
between the two branches while he was in office. Another democratic ideal President 
Carter valued highly was justice. Carter explained during his presidential campaign that, 
“one of the major responsibilities I have as a leader and as a potential leader is to try to 
establish justice.” He believed government should encourage fairness, which he often 
equated with yet another democratic value: equality.22 
President Carter believed the American people should be included in the 
democratic process. He insisted that “America’s foreign policy should reflect the 
character of the American people.” Carter thought the democratic heritage of the United 
States made its people uniquely moral and just. He believed that “in every foreign 
venture that has failed—weather it was Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Angola or in the 
excesses of the CIA—our government forged ahead without consulting the American 
people.” In all of these instances, Carter explained that the government “did things that 
were contrary” to the “basic character,” of the American people. The president had an 
unshakable faith in the public’s ability to act morally. In his view, “every successful 
foreign policy…was successful because it reflected the best that was in us.”23  
Logically, President Carter also believed that his foreign policy vision had 
received a mandate from the people upon his election. When discussing his human rights 
policy he expressed his desire to act according to the public will, stating “I believe I 
speak accurately for the American people on this subject.” Carter also sought to keep the 
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American public informed by communicating “directly and candidly.” The president 
published a book compilation of campaign speeches and interviews early in his 
presidency in an attempt to express “the personal beliefs and political themes upon which 
my candidacy was based.” President Carter felt it was important to communicate the 
views that he believed the American people had endorsed when they elected him 
president. Despite maintaining deep consternation for past immoral policies, the Carter 
administration believed that when the American people were able to influence foreign 
policy, they would do so in a way that reflected their fundamental moral character. Carter 
thought past foreign policy errors were not a reflection of the will of the inherently good 
majority of Americans. Instead these problems developed when a lack of transparency 
disconnected the American public from the democratic policy-making process. 24 
President Carter encouraged his administration to be democratically accountable 
through close collaboration and frequent communication with elected officials in 
Congress. Carter noted that the Nixon and Ford Administrations had “seriously damaged” 
the “longstanding traditions of a bipartisan policy and close consultation with Congress.” 
The president therefore sought to clarify and justify his policies to increase public and 
Congressional support. Secretary of State Vance met with members of Congress almost 
every week in an effort to explain executive policy and answer questions. Vance 
estimated that nearly one-fourth of his time was dedicated to legislative matters. The 
president too collaborated with Congressmen extensively. When drafting the Executive 
Order 12036 that reformed the U.S. intelligence agencies, President Carter recognized a 
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half dozen congressmen for their efforts to help draft the order. He thanked the chairman 
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Birch Bayh [D-IN] and former chairman 
Senator Daniel Inouye [D - HI], along with the chairman of the House Committee, 
Edward Boland [D – MA] for “a great deal of consultation and close cooperation.” Carter 
promoted democratic policies by consulting members of Congress about executive 
actions and foreign policy.25 
Soon after his confirmation as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance identified four 
principles of “realistic American foreign policy.” The first and most important was that, 
“foreign policy should be understood and supported by the American people and the 
Congress.” To achieve this democratic objective, the Carter administration sought to 
explain their foreign policy to both the public and their representatives in Congress in an 
effort to generate consensus and support. To reach out to the public, the president hosted 
frequent televised fireside chats, attended public forums, and held press interviews. 
Vance described how the president was an “earnest, intelligent man who grasped the 
necessity of basing his leadership and policies on the support and common sense of the 
American people.” President Carter always attempted to communicate his perspectives 
on policies to the American public. One example of such ardent communication, was 
Carter’s July 1979 televised “Crisis of Confidence” speech, during which he called on the 
American people to make civic sacrifices in an effort to pursue American ideals. The 
speech was poorly received, but the fact that Carter communicated his sincere view on 
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policy demonstrates his commitment to keeping the public informed and involved in the 
policy making process. Carter believed that providing information to citizens would 
encourage them to follow his moral example in support of his political and foreign policy 
goals.26 
 President Carter also envisioned the United States leading the world by example, 
through the promotion of justice. Carter planned for the U.S. to once again promote 
“more decent and just relations among people and among societies.” Promoting justice 
was also vital to the Carter administration. The president’s personal religious beliefs 
reinforced this value. Carter once described how he prayed to be able to “do simple 
justice through government.” When he took the oath of office, he chose a Bible passage 
emphasizing justice as well. His selection, Micah 6:8, reads, “what doth the Lord require 
of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with God?” Carter was 
clearly guided by the moral principles of justice and fairness and hoped the U.S. could 
help build a peaceful international system that would reflect these democratic values.27 
Equality was yet another democratic value President Carter sought to pursue. He even 
said that “the purpose of government is to alleviate inequalities.” Not only was the 
equality of man “self-evident” according to the Declaration of Independence, it was also 
an essential element within Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 
President Carter’s desire to promote equality was linked to his human rights campaign in 
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both the United States and abroad. Carter even applied his vision of greater equality on 
the international level. Not only did the Carter administration insist on individual 
equality, it also believed in treating other countries equally. Regardless of size, 
development, or military strength, the Carter administration sought to diplomatically 
engage with all nations.28 
President Carter valued equality because he recognized inequality threatened his 
ultimate goal of maintaining peace. He spoke about the growing wealth disparity between 
nations. “The world will not be a safe or decent place in which to live, however, if it 
continues to divide between countries which are increasingly rich and those which are 
increasingly impoverished.” The Carter administration believed it was the responsibility 
of rich nations to provide aid to less developed countries, and support programs that 
would specifically help the poor and reduce inequality.29 
Honesty and Transparency 
For President Carter making more open and transparent foreign policy decisions 
was also important within a democracy. Honesty was fundamental to his presidential 
campaign and foreign policy vision. Before he was elected, Carter emphatically stated, “I 
would not lie; I would not mislead the American people; I would not avoid taking a stand 
on a controversial issue which is important to our country or the world. And I would not 
betray your trust.” This commitment to honesty helped him claim the presidency, at a 
time when the public was widely skeptical about government credibility because of both 
the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Carter declared that the government “must 
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never again keep secret the evolution or our foreign policy from the Congress and the 
American people.” By emphasizing his commitment to moral principles, which included 
honesty, Carter sought to restore the public’s trust in the government.30 
The president recognized that without clear and honest information the people 
would be excluded from the democratic process. Carter forcefully argued the United 
States “must move away from making policies in secret; without the knowledge and 
approval of the American people.” He voiced disapproval of U.S. policy particularly 
when it involved secret negotiations. When campaigning for president, he specifically 
criticized Henry Kissinger’s service as Secretary of State, concluding that Kissinger 
“simply does not trust the judgement of the American people, but constantly conducts 
foreign policy exclusively, personally, and in secret.” Carter pledged to do the opposite in 
an effort to prevent further foreign policy disasters. He described how “each time our 
nation has made a serious mistake the American people have been excluded from the 
process.” He went on to criticize the government for the “tragedy of Vietnam and 
Cambodia,” “the disgrace of Watergate,” and the “embarrassment of the CIA,” whose 
assassination program was immoral and also violated human rights and international law. 
The president argued these mistakes “could have been avoided if our government had 
simply reflected the sound judgment and good common sense and the high moral 
character of the American people.” He called for a reevaluation of past government 
policies, “to strip away the secrecy,” so the U.S. could once again assume moral 
leadership within foreign policy. Carter described the importance of transparency, stating 
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“in a democratic system like ours, foreign policy decisions must be able to stand the test 
of public examination and public debate.” He pledged to be honest and open with 
American citizens in regards to foreign policy in an effort to build public trust.31  
The Carter administration encouraged communication and honest discussion 
within the government as well. In the State Department, Secretary Vance sought to open 
communication between officials of varying ranks by maintaining a “dissent channel.” 
Vance also sought to make the State Department’s personnel more representative of 
American society, furthering the administration’s effort to promote the democratic 
principle of equality.32 
Early in his presidency, Carter sought to win the trust of the American public by 
reforming U.S. intelligence agencies. Carter ended payments to foreign government 
officials who worked as informants, include Manuel Noriega of Panama. He stated that 
the U.S. “must not use the CIA or other covert means to effect violent change in any 
government or government policy.” In a speech before the intelligence community, he 
reinforced his fundamental belief in honesty when he called for all clandestine service 
members to “be even more pure and more clean and more decent and more honest than 
almost any persons who serve in government.” He believed this honesty was necessary 
due to the increased scrutiny the CIA faced after the public had learned of the illegal 
actions the agency carried out. 33 
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President Carter’s criticism of the CIA assassination program demonstrated his 
commitment to the most fundamental of human rights: the right to life. On January 24,  
1978, just four days after taking the oath of office, Carter issued the aforementioned 
Executive Order No. 12036, which included a prohibition on assassination.  Carter 
explained that the order established “in clear terms the responsibilities and limitations” of 
the intelligence community. President Mondale called the order “historic,” insisted that 
the U.S. could not only defend itself “within the law,” but could do so better than 
“through illegality.” Both Carter and Mondale were deeply troubled by the findings of the 
Church Committee and sought to reform U.S. intelligence protocol.34   
By August 1978, Carter had also removed George H. W. Bush from his position 
as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and appointed Admiral Stansfield Turner 
to the position. Turner recognized that the CIA was “to operate within the law” because 
“there were ethical limits as to what President Carter would want us to do.” He explained 
how he often consulted with the president before making difficult ethical decisions. Just 
months after Turner took charge of the Agency, Carter concluded that “relations between 
the CIA and the American public have been substantially improved.” He promised the 
American people “there are no illegal or improper actions now being conducted,” within 
the clandestine service. Carter recognized that transparency within the secret service was 
impossible, but sought to reassure the American people that the CIA was no longer 
breaking the law to carry out its foreign policy objectives. The president also pledged that 
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if he were to discover an “impropriety or an illegality I will not only take immediate 
action to correct it but also will let the American people know about it.”35 
Despite Carter’s objections to CIA activities carried out in the past, he did believe 
that intelligence was vital. He recognized that “we have got to have a good intelligence 
system in order to protect the security of our country.” Carter thought reforms were 
necessary within the intelligence community because “we sometimes relax too much in 
peacetime.” The result of secret service reforms was an emphasis on proactive rather than 
reactive intelligence. Carter judged the CIA was “one of the best means to make sure we 
don’t have war.” He recognized the inherent contradiction that the CIA created within an 
ideally transparent democratic government. No matter how ardently Carter valued 
honesty, he would not allow his commitment to get in the way of his most fundamental 
goal: maintaining security and peace.36 
President Carter also believed honesty was essential to reestablishing U.S. moral 
leadership. He believed that immoral policies had undermined the reputation of the U.S. 
During a 1976 presidential debate, Carter criticized his opponent stating “every time Mr. 
Ford speaks from a position of secrecy—in negotiation and secret treaties that have been 
pursued and achieved, in supporting dictatorships, in ignoring human rights—we are 
weak and the rest of the world knows it.” He went on to specifically criticize the secret 
nature of past policies in Vietnam, Chile, and Rhodesia. Carter emphatically declared that 
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“Americans have been shaken by tragic war abroad and by scandals and broken promises 
at home.” He explained, “we want to have faith again. We want to be proud again. We 
just want the truth again.” The president recognized that like the American people, other 
countries had lost faith and trust in the U.S government. “To be true to ourselves, we 
must be true to others,” he stated. For his foreign policy to be effective, and allow the 
U.S. to assume a leadership role within the world, he sought to restore honesty and 
transparency to diplomacy. President Carter spoke of American morals as absolute and 
stressed they would not only be applied domestically, but also internationally. During his 
inaugural address, Carter promised that the U.S. would “not behave in foreign places so 
as to violate our rules and standard here at home, for we know that the trust which our 
Nation earns is essential to our strength.” Reaffirming the value of truth and transparency 
was an essential aspect of President Carter’s overall foreign policy vision. He wished to 
demonstrate to the American public and countries around the world the moral redirection 
of his administration’s foreign policy.37 
Honesty was particularly important to the Carter Administration’s foreign policy 
vision, because the ultimate goal of this vision was for the U.S. to lead by example in an 
effort to promote democracy and peace. Carter recognized that inspiring other countries 
to follow the lead of the U.S. would require the trust of the international community.  The 
president hoped to gain international trust by honestly following through with past 
promises.  He pledged that the U.S. would, “always honor those commitments which 
have been made openly by our leaders and with full knowledge and involvement of the 
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people of our country.” Carter believed that honest policy would repair the tarnished 
reputation of the U.S.38  
Respect for Sovereignty 
Respect for the national sovereignty of other countries was another crucial aspect 
of President Carter’s foreign policy. For President Carter, respect for sovereignty went 
beyond criticizing the U.S. for engaging in unpopular foreign wars, or for carrying out 
covert operations that undermined democratic elections. While Carter voiced his 
disapproval of both of these policies, he also believed the U.S. should seek to reform its 
policy by demonstrating a new respect for sovereignty and not intervening in the affairs 
of other nations. In an address before the Organization of American States, Carter 
discussed his “high regard for the individuality and sovereignty of each Latin American 
and Caribbean nation.” He promised that the United States would “not act abroad in ways 
that we would not tolerate at home in our own country.” President Carter’s respect for 
national sovereignty was rooted in morality and particularly in his understanding of the 
golden rule.39 
The Carter administration also believed that respecting the sovereignty of other 
nations would increase the national security of the United States and promote global 
peace. Carter explained that the U.S. “doesn’t have an inclination to be involved in the 
internal affairs of another country unless our security should be directly threatened.” The 
president saw security as the only conceivable reason for the U.S. to infringe on the rights 
of another sovereign state. He went on to explain that the U.S. had “learned that never 
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again should our country become militarily involved in the internal affairs of another 
country unless there is a direct and obvious threat to the security of the U.S. or its 
people.” Carter committed the United States to respecting the sovereignty of other 
countries.40  
The president sought to improve the reputation of the United State by reiterating 
his respect for sovereignty. He explained that the reputation of the U.S, or “the moral 
heart of our international appeal—as a country which stands for self-determination and 
free choice—has been weakened.” Past policies that interfered with the democratic 
process were of particular concern to Carter. “I don’t think our country has a prerogative 
or responsibility to determine the form of government of other people,” he explained. The 
president again demonstrated his respect for democracy and sovereignty when he stated 
that despite past errors, “it is obviously un-American to interfere in the free political 
process of another nation.” Maintaining security and peace was again the ultimate goal of 
a policy that promoted international cooperation.41 
President Carter believed it was essential to correct past policy errors. Carter 
recognized that in the years before he was elected, the U.S. had “often been 
overextended, and deeply entangled in the internal affairs of distant nations.” He 
regretted that the U.S. “pursued dubious tactics,” and explained “‘national security’ has 
sometimes been a cover-up for unnecessary secrecy and national scandal.” One example 
of such a policy was the CIA effort to effectively negate the results of the 1973 
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democratic election of Salvador Allende in Chile. Such interference resulted in a 
devastating economic crisis and catastrophic human rights abuses in Chile, under the 
American backed regime of Augusto Pinochet. Carter wanted to guarantee the U.S. did 
not repeat the foreign policy errors it had made in the past. In order to assume a 
leadership role in the world, the U.S. had to redeem itself for past errors, which all too 
often infringed upon the sovereignty of other nations. Carter sought to improve the 
reputation of the United States by demonstrating respect for both the sovereignty of other 
nations and for human rights.42 
Human Rights 
President Carter was a well-known champion of human rights. During his 
inaugural address he stressed that the U.S. “commitment to human rights must be 
absolute.” When Carter discussed human rights he often spoke of those rights discussed 
in the United States government’s founding documents and the Bill of Rights in 
particular. Carter believed the U.S. was exceptionally able to lead the world in promoting 
human rights because Americans had a long history of enjoying these fundamental 
rights. Carter claimed human rights were “the soul” of his foreign policy and went on to 
explain, that his emphasis on human rights was “part of a broad effort to use our great 
power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world, a world in 
which human beings can live in peace, in freedom, and with their basic needs adequately 
met.” Again, the idea of moral leadership is reflected in Carter’s vision of foreign policy. 
President Carter recognized that human rights could be best protected during times of 
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peace, and also interpreted human rights quite broadly to include not only political civil 
rights, but also the economic rights.43 
The Carter administration sought to promote three different categories of human 
rights. Rights protecting the integrity of the person from governmental violation were of 
particular concern and included freedom from the most serious government violations, 
including “torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment; arbitrary 
arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home.” In regard to 
such rights, the Carter administration realized developing institutions to prevent such 
abuses was the ultimate goal. While addressing violations against individuals was 
certainly important, building a system that would respect human rights would provide 
more benefits to greater numbers of people.44  
The Carter administration defined economic rights as “an individual’s efforts to 
fulfill his vital needs for food, shelter, health care and education.” While, political rights 
were seen as most directly connected to the American “heritage and basic values,” and 
included all of the First Amendment rights Americans had long enjoyed, including, 
“freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press;” as well as 
freedom to move within and outside of a country and freedom to participate in 
government. The administration sought to expand political and economic rights in 
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countries where the government’s respect for the personal integrity of its citizens was 
already entrenched.45  
Carter also sought to work collaboratively with other countries to promote human 
rights. He stated “you will find the U.S. eager to stand beside those nations which respect 
human rights and which promote democratic ideals.” The Carter administration acted to 
promote human rights abroad by cutting of aid, especially military aid, opposing potential 
loans from international agencies, and making public statements about the importance of 
human rights and in some cases even specific instances of abuse. To confront a 
government guilty of serious human rights abuses, the Carter administration planned to 
unite the world behind its cause, and put forth effort “to bring to bear international 
opinion and concerted action by the world community against such a regime.” Carter 
sought to set an international agenda and foster cooperation among nations to promote a 
greater respect for international human rights and broader concern about human rights 
abuses.46 
The Carter administration recognized they needed to maintain “a principled yet 
pragmatic defense of basic human rights.” The need for a flexible human rights policy 
was undeniable, since many other political considerations had to be made simultaneously. 
Carter wanted the U.S. policy to be as productive as possible and realized that taking a 
stand against all incidents of abuse would not be realistic. President Carter understood 
human rights to include those same democratic rights of equality, justice, and sovereignty 
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previously discussed. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
specifically included these and many others in its detailed and thorough definition of 
human rights. The document’s preamble states “the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.” President Carter hoped to emphasize the very same principles and goals 
discussed within this fundamental human rights document.47  
President Carter promoted human rights by signing two additional human rights 
covenants and encouraging the Senate to ratify these measures. The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, identified within its first Article that 
“All peoples have the right of self-determination,” a right, which is inherently connected 
to President Carter’s respect for sovereignty. Any foreign policy that does not respect the 
territorial integrity or government authority of another nation, violates this fundamental 
right. Article I also goes on to recognize that “in no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.” President Carter believed that human rights included not only 
political civil rights, but also economic rights. The president thought that developed 
counties could protect the economic rights of people in developing nations by 
establishing mutually beneficial trade relationships. He believed the U.S. should not 
exploit other nations, but instead should work to improve conditions for all of humanity, 
elevating the ability of all people to economically sustain themselves.48 
The Carter administration recognized that taking action in other countries to 
protect human rights could potentially infringe on the sovereignty of those countries. 
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Carter’s National Security Director Brzezinski warned “conflicts in policy may arise 
when the security of the United States is linked to that of a country whose human rights 
priorities are deficient.” The administration recognized political objectives needed to be 
prioritized and they were not willing to jeopardize U.S. national security as they pursued 
human rights policy. Vance recognized the necessity of being “flexible and pragmatic in 
dealing with specific cases that might affect our national security.” Ultimately, the Carter 
administration recognized that taking action to curb human rights abuses needed to be 
done on a case by case basis. The president asked Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to chair an interagency committee aimed at ensuring human rights policy was 
integrated into the administration’s foreign policy.49  
President Carter also demonstrated his commitment to human rights through his 
appointment of Patricia M. Derian as his Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. 
Derian explained that U.S. human rights policy was guided by three basic principles, first 
American efforts were global, not narrowly focused on the Soviet Union as past foreign 
policy as a whole had been. Second, the Carter administration sought to “consider the 
unique political, social, cultural, and historical realities of different countries,” before 
developing appropriate tactics to help foster a greater respect for human rights. Lastly, 
human rights were one dimension of a foreign policy that also aimed to promote 
“national security, trade, and arms control.” These multifaceted interests made human 
rights policy particularly difficult to implement consistently.50 
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The Carter administration sought to advance the cause of human rights using a 
variety of tactics, including public statements, particularly “when quiet diplomacy fails.” 
Carter also sought to implement legislation promoting human rights, curb military sales 
to countries guilty of human rights abuses, and cut off economic aid.  Patricia Derian 
firmly connected the administration’s pursuit of international human rights and the 
reputation of the U.S. She believed the pursuit of moral ideals, including the protection of 
human rights, strengthened American “position and influence in the world.”  During a 
meeting with members of the European Human Rights Commission, Derian noted the 
effects of American human rights policy, stating “they strongly support it, and believe 
that through this policy the United States has regained much of the prestige it lost in 
recent years because of the pursuit of unwise policies elsewhere.” Promoting human 
rights was a genuine moral concern of President Carter, but he also felt such a policy 
would strengthen the reputation of the U.S. in the world.51 
The President sought to promote human rights by setting a positive example and 
helping to construct an international system in which human rights abuses were less 
likely to occur. The president sought to improve human rights conditions in countries by 
offering development assistance to countries that made efforts to protect these rights. 
President Carter’s Directive 30, No. 4 stated that “countries with a good or substantially 
improving record of human rights observance will be given special consideration in the 
allocation of U.S. foreign assistance.” The Carter administration successfully supported 
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congressional action to cut off aid to Argentina in 1978 when the government was 
committing egregious human rights violations. 52 
This endeavor was successful due to the hard work and diligence of Patricia 
Derian, who travelled repeatedly to Argentina in 1977 and demanded policy change from 
both the U.S. and Argentine governments. Derian stressed the U.S. commitment to 
human rights and advised the president to demand the military, C.I.A. and F.B.I. all 
support the human rights policy of the State Department. She vocally criticized the 
Argentine government for “the systematic use of torture, summary execution of political 
dissidents, the disappearance and the imprisonment of thousands of individuals without 
charge…and the failure of the government of Argentina to fulfill its commitment to allow 
[a] visit by the Inter American Commission on human rights.” Her efforts to end human 
rights abuses in Argentina demonstrated her personal moral principles as well as the 
Carter administration’s vehement commitment to human rights.53 
The Carter administration recognized that the global protection of human rights 
would not come about immediately. National Security Chief Brzezinski noted that the 
U.S. was “part of a political and historical process,” to promote human rights.  In addition 
to Argentina, the Carter administration’s policy made a positive difference in Chile and 
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Uruguay. Regretfully, the administration failed to implement its human rights policy 
consistently over time. While its early efforts most clearly reflect President Carter’s 
vision, later policy, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reflected the same 
concern about communism identifiable in the policies of his predecessors.54  
International Cooperation and U.S. Leadership 
 President Carter’s firm belief in the moral correctness of his foreign policy also 
led him to believe that the U.S. should provide moral leadership through its foreign 
policy. To do so Carter sought repentance for the nation’s past errors in order to build 
confidence in the moral righteousness of his policies. In his inaugural address, Carter 
declared, “we must once again have faith in our country—and in one another… Let our 
recent mistakes bring a resurgent commitment to the basic principles of our Nation, for 
we know that if we despise our own government we have no future.” Carter believed that 
just as individuals can repent for past transgressions, so too can nations. Carter was open 
and honest about what he believed to be errors the U.S. committed in the past, because he 
believed in the value of repentance and sought to reform a political system he believed 
had been damaged by immoral policies of the past.55 
President Carter also sought to shift his foreign policy away from the anti-
communist policy of containment. He believed past policy focused too exclusively on 
Soviet-U.S. relations. Even prior to his election, Carter envisioned collaborating closely 
with American allies and engaging in diplomacy to promote peace. Carter complained 
that in the past the “government has been so obsessed with balance of power politics that 
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it often ignored basic American values and a proper and common concern for human 
rights.” Carter’s administration favored a more inclusive global approach. It aimed “to 
strive for multilateral agreements and solutions to critical problems.” The president 
believed “ties of friendship and cooperation with our friends and neighbors must be 
strengthened,” in order to take steps toward addressing problems that could affect all 
countries of the world.56  
The Carter administration recognized that globalization was dramatically 
changing the international system, and believed the U.S. could no longer neglect the 
developing world. Not since the Kennedy administration had a president and his foreign 
policy advisors paid close attention to promoting progress in the developing world. While 
America's containment policy at times drew attention to less developed countries, this 
attention was often an effort to maintain a favorable balance of power vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. Secretary of State Vance criticized past U.S. policy for “not understanding the 
explosive forces of change in the developing world.” The Carter administration 
recognized economic insecurity and human rights violations throughout the world 
presented a threat to global peace. Vance explained that the “future was inextricably 
entwined with the economic and political developments of a turbulent Third World.” To 
address this reality, the Carter administration set goals within many parts of the 
developing world. When listing their most pressing foreign policy issues, Vance 
identified the Middle East, East Asia, southern Africa, China, and Panama 
specifically. The Carter administration sought to leave behind narrowly focused foreign 
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policy focused only on the Soviet Union. Carter envisioned a global approach to foreign 
policy that was less centered on U.S.-Soviet relations.57 
When reflecting on the U.S. desire to assume a leadership role in the world, Cyrus 
Vance mentioned that the administration “agreed that our allies were hoping we would 
provide clear and consistent American leadership.” Carter also felt the U.S. was 
especially prepared to take on a leadership role within the international community due to 
the county’s “reservoir of strength—economic strength, which we are willing to share; 
military strength, which we hope never to use again; and the strength of ideals, which are 
determined fully to maintain the backbone of our own foreign policy.” President Carter 
believed the United States to have an exceptional mission to promote international 
collaboration and maintain peace while also demonstrating the value of the democratic 
principles embodied in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, reflected in the United 
Nations Charter and identified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.58  
 The Carter administration planned to implement mutually beneficial foreign 
policy. Carter hoped common international problems could be solved through 
collaboration with other nations. He pointed out that “the intensity of our interrelated 
problems is rapidly increasing, and better mechanisms for consultation must be 
established and utilized before these problems become more dangerous.” Carter 
recognized scarce energy resources, growing inequality, and environmental degradation 
to be some of the problems that not only affected the entire world, but required a global 
response to solve. The president and his Secretary of State both agreed that U.S. “allies 
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were hoping we would provide clear and consistent American leadership,” and “felt 
confident that for the first time in years, the United States was politically, 
psychologically, and materially capable of offering leadership.” The Carter 
administration believed it was an international necessity for the U.S. to assume a 
leadership role.59 
President Carter wanted to reestablish a cooperative relationship with Latin 
American countries specifically. Speaking to the Permanent Council of the Organization 
of American States in Washington, just months after his inauguration, Carter said “the 
challenge we face is to awake our institutions to a changing world. We must focus our 
attention on the problems which face our countries and tailor each solution to its 
problem.” Carter favored diplomacy and international collaboration to resolve problems 
in an increasingly integrated world. He admitted, “my heart and my interest to a major 
degree is in Latin America.” The president even spoke some Spanish; although he also 
joked in Spanish that he would, “follow the advice of my friends, who have the opinion 
that, in the interest of good relations, it would be best not to speak Spanish today.” Carter 
hoped to “strengthen the ties of friendship and a sense of common purpose and close 
consultation with the nations and the peoples of the Caribbean and Latin America,” For 
President Carter, international collaboration could potentially benefit all nations and was 
an essential step toward achieving a peaceful international system.60 
Carter also believed that taking on a leadership role in the world required the U.S. 
to take an active role within international organizations, including the United Nations 
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(UN) and Organization of American States (OAS). When addressing the international 
community, Carter hoped to “underline his fundamental support for the institutions of the 
United Nations, for multilateral international cooperation.” Carter spoke reverently of the 
United Nations as a “house where the shared hopes of the world can find a voice.” When 
speaking at the OAS, Carter stressed “a need for constant cooperation, consultation, and 
harmony among nations,” and identified a new agreement with Panama as a step toward 
such cooperation.61 
In addition to working within the OAS, President Carter also sought to correct 
past policy errors made in Latin America. Secretary Vance believed the U.S. “should 
forge a sounder, more equal relationship with Latin America.” The Panama Canal treaties 
sought to do just that. The Carter administration identified past American policies as 
problematic and pledged to work with developing nations in a more respectful and 
mutually beneficial way. President Carter and his foreign policy advisors noted how 
previous administrations had either ignored relations with Latin America, or damaged 
them through their foreign policy. Carter hoped “to reduce misunderstanding and 
promote good relationships among people and groups in the region.” Vance recognized 
that upon taking office, the Carter administration was “faced with the consequences of 
our long neglect and the residue of resentment stemming from past paternalism,” 
throughout Latin America. The Carter administration believed past actions and policies in 
Latin America had damaged the reputation of the United States which would impair the 
country’s ability to serve as a world leader and promote peace.62 
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While President Carter internationalized U.S. foreign policy, he did not neglect 
U.S.-Soviet relations. He planned to continue implementing the policy of détente, which 
Vance described as an easing of tensions. The president recognized that this policy “was 
not easy to define or to defend to the American public.” Despite this challenge, President 
Carter hoped to reduce tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union in order to fulfill his 
ultimate goal of promoting world peace. To further his policy, the Carter administration 
put great effort into the second round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) with 
the Soviet Union. The agreement that resulted from these talks certainly reflected the 
Carter administration’s policy vision and desire to promote peace, but Carter recognized 
that the treaties did not have the necessary Senate support to be ratified. In fact, the 
president recalled that some Republican leaders who voted to ratify the Panama Canal 
treaties, including Senator Howard Baker [R-TN], stated that “they would never support 
SALT II, no matter what was in it.” Scholars have noted that the President used 
considerable political capital on the Panama treaties. The president was willing to do this 
because the treaties aligned so closely with his foreign policy vision. President Carter 
continued to lobby for public support of SALT II, but eventually withdrew the agreement 
from congressional consideration after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.63 
Carter believed the U.S. should lead the world in creating an international system 
that valued international cooperation. To do so, Carter knew the United States needed to 
exercise restraint and engage in diplomacy rather than use military force. In his inaugural 
address, Carter described his commitment to restraint, explaining “the powerful must not 
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persecute the weak.” This notion harkened back to Franklin Roosevelt’s 1943 Christmas 
radio address, during which Roosevelt claimed “the doctrine that the strong shall 
dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it.” President Carter’s 
foreign policy principles had both spiritual and historical foundations. Religion inspired 
President desire for the U.S. to take on a leadership role in the world. The president cited 
Micah 4:3 as the foundation for his belief that powerful countries should lead rather than 
exploit weaker nations.  The passage states, “and He shall judge among many people, and 
rebuke strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their 
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall 
they learn war any more.” Carter indeed sought to deemphasize the military strength of 
the U.S. and inspire global change through moral leadership.  Carter conceded in his 
inaugural address that “we do not seek to intimidate” other countries regarding their 
human rights policies. He described his plan to “maintain strength so sufficient that it 
need not be proven in combat—a quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal 
but on nobility of ideas.” Carter hoped U.S. moral leadership would bring about 
international cooperation. His faith in the righteousness of his ideals and the values of the 
American nation likely bolstered his confidence.64  
Despite recognizing the strength of the United States, the Carter administration 
also realized that independently working towards peace was not as constructive as 
encouraging collaboration and mediating conflicts. Carter knew that alone “the United 
States cannot solve the problems of the world.” He spoke of past policy errors and the 
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damaged reputation of the U.S., stating “the good will our country once enjoyed, based 
on what we stood for and the willingness of others to follow our example, has been 
dissipated.” The Carter administration wanted to use international organizations to repair 
the reputation of the United States and once again set an example of moral and 
democratic leadership in the world.65 
The Carter administration sought to earn international respect by following 
through with past commitments. Vice President Mondale recognized that “all the military 
might in the world does not enable us to command the respect we once had in the 
international arena.” The administration also recognized the importance of domestic 
policy, when attempting to assume an international leadership role. “World leadership 
and respect will be determined by how well we meet the needs of our people—for only in 
that way can this nation recapture its unique claim to being the last, best hope for 
mankind.” The Vice President expressed his high expectations for the leadership potential 
of the United States government. He also refused to let the tumultuous foreign policy 
conflicts of the Cold War inspire isolationist policies, pledging that the U.S. was “not 
opting out of the world.” Instead, he agreed with President Carter’s view that the United 
States should be “leading the way toward economic progress and social justice and a 
stronger, more stable international order.” The Carter administration believed U.S. 
leadership was an essential aspect of a foreign policy vision aimed at creating a just and 
peaceful world.66 
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The president listed the many ways in which the U.S. was prepared to promote 
peace, democracy, and justice. Carter called on Americans to “remember that because of 
our tremendous and continuing economic, military, and political strength, the United 
States has an inevitable role of leadership to play within the community of nations.” 
President Carter believed that the U.S. and other developed countries had a special 
responsibility to improve the world. He was proud to lead the world in advocating for 
human rights as well. Carter planned for the U.S. to take on a “leadership role and let the 
world say that the focal point for the preservation and protection of human rights is in the 
United States of America.”67   
Promoting Peace 
President Carter rightly admitted that his administration had “broad aspirations.” 
Vance noted that the president preferred “a bold ‘comprehensive’ approach rather than a 
more modest ‘incremental,’ building on past agreements. Like the United Nations, the 
president’s highest priority was the maintenance of peace. Not only did the president 
believe it was his responsibility to guarantee national security, but he also pledged that 
the U.S. would “be tenacious and determined in our search for a greater world peace.” 
Carter explained that American “interests lie in protecting our national security, in 
preventing war, in peacefully promoting the principles of human freedom and 
democracy, and in exemplifying in our foreign policy the true attitudes and character of 
the American people.” President Carter’s ultimate goal was to maintain peace, and he 
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believed the best way to do this was for the U.S. to set an example for other countries 
throughout the world by pursing just foreign policy. 68  
President Carter argued that no matter how important maintaining national 
security was, this interest should not be used to rationalize immoral foreign policy. Vice 
President Walter Mondale argued that “the fog of national security helped to lead us into 
the tragic swamp of Vietnam, into the morass called Watergate.” The Carter 
administration recognized national security had been used as a justification for past 
immoral policies. President Carter felt that the U.S. should avoid military entanglements 
at all costs and sought to do so by pursing diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts. Vice 
President Mondale also criticized the past militarization of American foreign policy. He 
argued that such narrow policy made the United States “virtually helpless when 
confronted by major international economic problems, such as energy.” The Carter 
administration acknowledged that new global problems would require collaborative 
solutions instead of costly military endeavors. The administration wanted to broaden 
foreign policy in an effort to work constructively with other nations to solve problems 
that could potentially threaten international peace.69     
 President Carter also sought to promote peace by advocating for a reduction in 
arms sales internationally. The Carter administration sought to curb the U.S. private sale 
of arms throughout the world and encouraged other developed countries to do so as well. 
Cyrus Vance promised a Soviet delegation at a meeting in Moscow just months after the 
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president was inaugurated, that the U.S. planned “to make a serious effort to restrain and 
reduce this trade.” The Carter administration promised that “the United States would 
show restraint in its own arms sale,” and aimed to bring about a more peaceful and less 
violent world through the control of both conventional and nuclear arms.70 
President Carter celebrated the promotion of peace within other regions as well, 
including Latin America. His administration hoped “to work with all nations to halt the 
spread of nuclear explosive capabilities,” and he commended Latin American nations for 
signing the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which declared Latin America a nuclear-weapon 
free zone. Carter pledged the U.S. would not move nuclear weapons into Latin America 
when he signed Protocol I of this treaty on May 26, 1977, demonstrating yet again his 
personal commitment to nonproliferation.71 
Secretary of State Vance also strongly believed in the pursuit of peace. In his 
memoirs he noted that President Kennedy’s belief that peace is the “necessary rational 
end of rational men,” also reflected his own personal views. Vance concluded that there 
was “no more urgent task,” than the pursuit of peace. He thought that peace would evolve 
gradually through “a series of concrete actions and effective agreements.” The Panama 
Canal treaties were one example of policy the administration pursued in pursuit of 
peace.72 
President Carter demonstrated his goal of promoting peace went beyond 
maintaining the security of the U.S. when he mediated talks between Egyptian President 
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Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in 
September of 1978. The Camp David Accords were developed during twelve days of 
talks and aimed to end three decades of conflict between Egypt and Israel. President 
Sadat spoke highly of Carter’s “determination to purse what is right,” and recognized that 
the “paramount commitment” of the American president was “to the cause of peace and 
the universal brotherhood of man.” For their efforts to come to an agreement, Sadat and 
Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 and went on to sign a finalized peace 
agreement based upon the Camp David Accords in March of 1979. President Carter’s 
commitment to peace was an overarching goal that extended beyond the borders of the 
United States.73 
 Ultimately, the president sought to help create an international system that would 
promote American ideals and establish a lasting global peace. He spoke of this vision in 
his inaugural address stating that in the years following his presidency “I would hope that 
the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting peace, based not on 
weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious 
values.” Again, Carter’s message reflects his ultimate goal and his belief in the unique 
strength of American values.  President Carter certainly counted human rights among 
those values as well as American democratic principles. He argued “we know the best 
way to enhance the freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic 
system is worthy of emulation.” Carter strove to set a positive example through American 
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action. One of the first actions he took as president was to pursue negotiation and 
ratification of new Panama Canal treaties.74 
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CHAPTER III: 
REFLECTING A VISION: THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 
The moral nature of President Carter’s foreign policy is evident when considering 
many of the foreign policy issues he pursued, including the SALT II negotiations and the 
Camp David Accords. Like these more obvious examples of Carter’s morally inspired 
foreign policy, the Panama Canal treaties were also meant to advance President Carter’s 
overarching foreign policy vision. When the Panama Canal treaties became a divisive 
political issue, the Carter administration chose to lead an intense political battle to get the 
treaties ratified. The administration recognized they were key to establishing new and 
productive relationships among the U.S. and Latin American countries. The treaties also 
helped the U.S. to repair its international reputation and gain credibility. Examining the 
struggle for ratification of the Panama Canal treaties provides great insights into both the 
President Carter’s foreign policy principles and his administration’s foreign policy vision. 
Why did President Carter believe the Panama Canal treaty reflected his moral foreign 
policy vision? To answer that question, it is essential to study the president’s 
understanding of the Panama Canal’s history. 
Historical Inspiration 
President Carter recalled he was originally prompted to study the Panama Canal 
treaty issue in greater detail during his campaign for president in 1975 when thirty-eight 
senators sponsored a resolution never to change the original Panama Canal Treaty signed 
in 1903. Carter read a great deal about the history of the canal’s construction and began 
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to question the traditional celebratory history of the canal. Like many Americans and 
historians, President Carter had a difficult time reconciling the great success of the 
canal’s construction with the diplomatic duplicity involved in securing the rights to 
construct it. The president sought to explain this history to the American people to justify 
new canal treaties. He described the United States’ role in Panama achieving its 
independence, but also identified the original 1903 canal treaty between the U.S. and 
Panama as one of the “problems that plague us from the past.” Carter lamented both the 
way in which the original treaty had been negotiated as well as the fairness of the treaty 
provisions. The Carter administration sought to negotiate and ratify new treaties to 
address the major points of contention between the U.S. and Panama.75 
At the turn of the 20th Century, Panama was a Colombian province. That all 
changed in 1903, when the U.S. backed Panamanian independence from Colombia, by 
moving the U.S. Navy into Colon Harbor after a Panamanian revolt. Such a show of force 
allowed for a successful and bloodless revolution to take place in Panama. After 
recognizing Panamanian independence, the U.S. used its position of power to bargain for 
the right to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. U.S. officials negotiated a treaty 
with Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a Frenchman, who was appointed Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary by Panamanian leaders. Bunau-Varilla had 
encouraged the Panamanian revolt, hoping to negotiate a canal agreement with the United 
States. The U.S., had long been interested in constructing a Central American canal and 
had originally signed a treaty with Colombia for canal rights in 1846. Bunau-Varilla had 
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a financial stake in the construction of a canal across Panama. He had invested in the 
1879-1888 French effort to construct a sea level canal, and after that endeavor failed, he 
sought out to negotiate a canal treaty between the U.S. and Panama to recoup some of his 
losses. Acting on Panama’s behalf, Bunau-Varilla travelled to the U.S. and signed a 
treaty offering very generous terms to the United States, before the Panamanian 
delegation even arrived in Washington to join the negotiations. Panamanians objected to 
the treaty immediately, but believed their very independence rested upon the treaty’s 
ratification. One of President Carter’s primary objection to the original treaty was that 
“no Panamanian ever saw the treaty at all before it was signed.” Panamanians began 
protesting the terms of this treaty immediately although they could not do so freely 
fearing that without U.S. military support, Colombia could try to force Panama to once 
again have a provincial status. In the decades before President Carter’s election 
Panamanians consistently demanded revisions to the original canal agreement. 76  
In 1903, with the U.S. now guaranteeing Panamanian independence, the 
Panamanian Senate ratified the Hay Bunau-Varilla Treaty.  The agreement granted the 
U.S a 10 mile wide strip of land through which the U.S. would lead an effort to construct 
a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This “Canal Zone” effectively 
divided the new republic in two and also became a barrier to free movement of 
Panamanians within their own country. The treaty also offered. “all rights, power and 
authority....which the United States would possess and exercise as if it were the sovereign 
of the territory.” While Panama technically retained legal sovereignty over its territory, 
the U.S. acted “as if it were the sovereign” of the territory. The U.S. imposed tariffs on 
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the importation of goods into the Canal Zone, claimed legal jurisdiction, ran its own mail 
system, used U.S. currency, and controlled the air space above the Zone. In addition to 
objecting to the sovereignty clause, Panamanians also objected to the term of the treaty, 
which stated it would be in effect “in perpetuity.” The treaty’s inequitable terms would 
endure unless a new treaty was negotiated. President Carter saw renegotiation as a 
necessity. He did not believe the original treaty accurately reflect the values and character 
of the American people.  
President Carter describe the original Panama Canal Treaty as “obviously unfair.” 
He cited U.S. Secretary of State John Hay’s 1903 assessment of the treaty to support this 
claim. Hay described the treaty terms as “vastly advantageous to the United States 
and…not so advantageous to Panama.” The Carter administration planned to negotiate 
new treaties that would align with the President’s moral foreign policy vision. Upon 
taking office, Carter’s desire to pursue a new canal treaty reflected his sense of historical 
justice. The treaty that allowed the U.S. to construct the Panama Canal “cheated the 
Panamanians out of their canal,” according to President Carter.  Carter felt the new 
Panama Canal treaties were necessary to correct the “injustice,” of the 1903 Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty.77 
President Carter’s interest in redeeming the U.S. for past policy errors increased 
his interest in the Panama Canal issue. He studied the topic at length, learning that the 
U.S. had settled the dispute over Panamanian independence with Colombia in 1921 with 
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the Thomson-Urritia Treaty. The U.S. support for Panamanian independence and the 
subsequent construction of the Panama Canal violated this earlier treaty. To compensate 
Colombia, the U.S. agreed to pay $25 million dollars for the canal rights it had acquired 
from Panama. Panama however received very few economic benefits after the canal was 
constructed. The U.S. did share any profits collected from the operation of the canal. The 
Thomson-Urritia treaty did however acknowledge the legitimacy of Panamanian 
independence, which meant after 1921, Panamanians could increasingly advocate for a 
fairer canal arrangement. Panama no longer had to worry that Colombia would try to 
reclaim Panamanian territory. 
Panama objected to the economic arrangements the 1903 treaty had established. 
The country did not receive a share of any of the tolls collected from ships that used the 
waterway. The tariffs imposed on trade within the Canal Zone, made relations between 
the U.S. and Panama even more strained. One estimate suggested that the U.S. benefited 
four or five to one from trade with Panama.78 
In 1931, Panamanian protests and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor,” 
policy inspired the U.S. to offer additional canal profits to Panama. However, this 
agreement, did not solve the two primary Panamanian objections: the U.S. infringing on 
Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone and perpetuity of the original 1903 treaty. 
Panamanians also argued that the U.S. kept Canal tolls artificially low.  
Despite the dubious negotiations involved in reaching the 1903 canal agreement, 
President Carter refused to shy away from the mainstream notion that the construction of 
the canal was an unprecedented historical achievement. He said that “building the canal 
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was one of the greatest engineering feats of history.” Despite his objections to the 
original canal treaty, the agreement did make way for the successful construction of the 
Panama Canal. U.S. effort to construct the canal took over a decade and cost the lives of 
an estimated 5,600 workers. Carter encouraged Americans to feel “justly and deeply 
proud of this great achievement.” Perhaps such patriotic rhetoric was meant to balance 
the president’s complaints about the original treaty. What is evident is that the Carter 
administration did not let sentimentality about the canal’s construction hinder their efforts 
to negotiate a new and more just agreement.79 
The Carter administration followed through with negotiations of two new treaties 
that would solve the two primary objections Panamanians had to the 1903 treaty. Rather 
than enduring for perpetuity, like the original treaty was intended to, the new Panama 
Canal Treaty would turn over control of the canal to Panama on a set date: December 31, 
1999. The treaty also outlined the steps that would be taken toward this transition in the 
interim period. The Canal would be controlled by a new U.S. Government agency, the 
Panama Canal Commission, which would initially have a board of five Americans and 
four Panamanians, with increased Panamanian membership over time.80 
The Neutrality Treaty, guaranteed perpetual joint defense of the Panama Canal. 
President Carter believed the U.S. and Panama shared an interest in defending the canal, 
and this treaty guaranteed a cooperative partnership between the two countries. The treaty 
stated that the U.S. and Panama have a “responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal 
will remain open and secure to ships of all nations.” President Carter believed the 
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Panama Canal treaties exemplified his foreign policy vision because they allowed him to 
correct an unjust and dishonest policy. The treaties demonstrated U.S. respect for 
Panamanian sovereignty and allowed the U.S. to act as a leader among American 
countries, fostering cooperation and ultimately promoting peace.81 
Democratic Ideals 
The two new treaties reflected the Carter administration’s respect for democratic 
values. While the president was aware the treaty would face a great deal of public 
opposition, he believed the American people would ultimately support his treaty efforts if 
they were properly informed on the topic. His own personal experience demonstrated that 
a person’s position could change on the issue, especially when they have access to more 
information. Carter himself had reversed his position on the Panama Canal. During his 
presidential campaign he vowed to not give up control of the canal. After his election, he 
asked for a report on the issue and studied the topic further. The report alarmingly 
concluded that “the most urgent issue the new administration will face in the Western 
Hemisphere in 1977 is unquestionably the smoldering dispute with Panama.” Once the 
President became more familiar with the history of the original canal treaty, he realized 
the need for an updated agreement was vital. Carter believed, the American people would 
follow his lead and recognize the new Panama Canal treaties were a moral imperative.82  
Carter argued that Americans “believe in good will and fairness, as well as 
strength. This agreement with Panama is something we want because we know it is 
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right.” Carter consistently demonstrated a confidence in the American public’s ability to 
judge what was morally right. Carter’s concern for justice or fairness is echoed 
throughout his support of the Panama Canal treaties. He focused in particular on the idea 
of cooperation of with Panama and the fact that through cooperation both countries could 
reach agreements that produced mutual benefits. Carter conceded “it is not easy to accept 
a change which has been so profoundly balanced in our favor and which can now be of 
equal benefit to both countries. But ours is a great country, and it’s great enough to be 
fair.” Again, Carter recognized the power of acting according to moral standards, and 
suggested the American people had an exceptional ability to do this. He believed the U.S. 
could successfully break away from its history of interference and exploitation in Latin 
American relations. Following the Senate ratification of the Panama Canal treaties he 
thanked the American people for their commitment to moral principles and their 
representatives in the Senate “who have done what was right, because it was right.” 
Carter certainly believed in the moral correctness of the Panama Canal treaty policy and 
felt the American people would rightly favor its ratification if he informed them about the 
treaties.83 
The Panama Canal treaties also illustrate the Carter administration’s respect for 
democracy, when considering its efforts to collaborate with Congress. The president 
believed a greater familiarity with the Panama Canal issue would increase support for the 
new treaties, although the president admits that the Panama initiative was “the most 
unpleasant of all,” of his efforts to collaborate with Congress. Certainly the issue became 
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quite challenging. The president arranged for forty-four U.S. Senators to visit Panama 
before the ratification vote took place. Carter was confident the treaties were a bipartisan 
issue, and U.S. Senator Jacob Javits [R-NY]concurred with his assessment, describing 
how ratification of the treaties would represent “a great demonstration of the 
bipartisanship of the foreign policy of the United States.” President Carter asked both 
Republicans and Democrats to unite in support of the Panama Canal treaties because he 
believed it was in best interest of all people to do so.84 
President Carter also celebrated the fact that the treaties would face a test of 
democracy within Panama. The Panamanian Constitution required the people to vote on 
the treaties in a national plebiscite. He felt that this vote would legitimize the treaties 
throughout Panama, and also encourage the American people to follow Panamanians in 
supporting the treaties. While the government of Panama was led by a military dictator, 
General Omar Torrijos, Carter celebrated the fact that the Panama Canal treaties received 
democratic approval of the people. The results of the U.N. monitored national plebiscite 
were by no means unanimous, but over 90 percent of Panamanians reportedly voted and 
the treaties were approved an approximate two-thirds majority.85 
The Carter administration also celebrated the international democratic support the 
Panama Canal treaties had received, particularly from Latin American countries. 
Secretary Vance told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “the democratic 
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governments of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica issued a joint 
communique urging the United States and Panama to conclude the new treaties 
rapidly.”86 
Equality had also been a contentious issue within the Panama Canal Zone. Racist 
policies determined the pay and living conditions of those who had worked to build the 
canal. American employees were paid by a gold standard, while Panamanians and West 
Indian immigrants were compensated according the silver standard, which was 
considerably lower. In 1955, an additional treaty agreement was reach between the U.S. 
and Panama. The Remon-Eisenhower Treaty increased the annual annuity paid to 
Panama, based on “equitable considerations,” included an agreement that the U.S. would 
construct a bridge across the Canal, and also theoretically prohibited discriminatory pay 
differentials. The U.S. Congress was slow to fulfill these new treaty obligations. It took 
more than three years to begin constructing the bridge and Panamanians continued to 
dominate lower level positions within the Canal Zone, while Americans filled the higher 
paying specialized positions. As of 1976, the twenty-seven percent of Americans working 
within the Canal Zone earned nearly fifty percent of Canal Company wages. Despite the 
American Civil Rights Movement, Panamanians and Zonians—Americans living within 
the Canal Zone—continued to live within separate spheres in Panama. The 1977 Panama 
Canal treaties required the Panama Canal Commission give preference to qualified 
Panamanians when hiring. President Carter sought to correct past discrimination and 
promote equality. 87 
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President Carter believed that the treaties did away with an unequal and 
exploitative relationship in favor of a more just or equal arrangement. At the treaty 
signing ceremony on September 7, 1977, the president spoke at length about the Panama 
Canal treaties representing a fair or just agreement. He sincerely believed the treaties 
were in the best interest of the United States, Panama, and other countries, who used the 
canal for trade. The treaties also allowed the U.S. and Panama to maintain security of the 
Panama Canal. Carter recognized the Canal was more economically significant to 
Panama than it was to the U.S. Far more valuable than retaining control of the canal, was 
the prospect of improved relations between the United States and developing countries 
around the world. 
The Carter administration believed the treaties also promoted justice by providing 
Panama with greater economic benefits. Secretary Vance explained that under the new 
treaties, Panama received payments “which more fairly reflect the fact that it is making 
available its major national resource, its territory.” The Carter administration did 
communicate that these fair payments were morally just. Instead, they pragmatically 
pointed out that the potential for profit would encourage Panama to protect the canal and 
operate it as efficiently as possible. The Carter administration chose to emphasize 
pragmatic arguments rather than moral justifications in an effort to promote the treaties as 
broadly as possible.88 
President Carter also believed the Panama Canal treaties embodied a “just 
settlement” between the United States and Panama because they sought to establish a 
relationship of equality between a large powerful country and a small weaker one. Carter 
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spoke of “a feeling of a new opportunity for friendship, the recognition of common 
purpose, cooperation, and mutual respect on an equal basis.” The president believed the 
Panama Canal treaties represented this principle of equality and cooperation. He wished 
to engage all of Latin America “not as a powerful nation looking down upon a weak 
nation; not as a father looking down on a son; not as a strong brother looking on a weak 
brother--but as equals, because I see very clearly we can derive as much or more benefit 
from good relations with our friends in Latin America even than they can derive from 
us.” Carter truly believed the Panama treaties were truly just or fair because they were 
mutually beneficial to both the United States and Panama.89 
Honesty and Transparency 
President Carter also hoped the Panama Canal treaties would reflect his moral 
principles of honesty and transparency as he led public education campaigns within the 
U.S. to provide truthful and honest information about the treaties. The idea that education 
and awareness would convince people to support the treaties reflected the President 
Carter’s moral certitude. The administration estimated that the opposition to the treaties 
was often “based on misunderstanding and misinformation.” Therefore, the 
administration planned to educate the American public to do the morally correct thing 
and support the new agreements. Public opinion polls showed informed citizens were 
more likely to support the treaties. Poll results encouraged the administration to expand 
its public education campaigns. President Carter hosted fireside chats to answer questions 
about the treaties, scheduled telephone call-in sessions on the radio, and supported an 
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informational mailing campaign to inform the public about the content of the treaties. In 
the months leading up to the Senate vote, the President also made a nationwide televised 
statement in support of the treaties. By involving the public he promoted honesty as well 
as democratic transparency in the foreign policy process.90 
President Carter believed pursuing ratification of the Panama Canal treaties was 
the honest thing to do. The treaties were negotiated over fourteen years during the terms 
of four previous administrations, and Carter believed following through with a past U.S. 
commitment was essential.  An administration official warned that not following through 
with the treaties “will invite charges of ‘bad faith.” One informational mail brochure 
focused on the four presidents that had committed themselves to negotiating a new treaty 
with Panama, stressing the idea that Senate ratification would represent the fulfillment of 
their promise to Panama. President Johnson had made this commitment, in consultations 
with former presidents Truman and Eisenhower, on December 18, 1964, thirteen years 
earlier. Not only did President Carter believe the 1903 treaty was immorally deceptive 
and unjust, he also believed the U.S. had made an honest commitment to Panama and 
should follow through with the negotiations and ratification of a new treaty agreement.91  
When negotiating the treaties, Carter also believed it was important to honor the 
past principles established during the negotiation efforts of his predecessors. The 
Kissinger-Tack Agreement, was reached during the Ford administration’s effort to 
negotiate a new agreement with Panama. The Carter administration resumed negotiations 
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pledging to adhere to this agreement. The principles included a promise that the revised 
treaty would have a specific termination date and would allow Panama to claim 
sovereignty within the Canal Zone.92 
Respect for Sovereignty 
In 1904, the newly independent country of Panama voted to adopt a new 
constitution. Knowing that independence depended on the strength of the American naval 
presence in Panama Harbor, the legislature included a controversial and contradictory 
guarantee within the Panamanian Constitution. Article 136 of this document stated that 
“the government of the United State may intervene in any part of the Republic of Panama 
to reestablish public peace and constitutional order.” This clause effectively relinquished 
Panamanian sovereignty to the United States for the purpose of guaranteeing Panamanian 
sovereignty, thus subordinating the latter to the former. The U.S., took advantage of this 
clause, intervening in Panama on several occasions. The U.S. also began to build a strong 
military presence on the isthmus.93  
The 1978 Panama Canal treaties attempted to end the seventy-five year power 
struggle over sovereignty in the Canal Zone. When the treaties were first signed, 
President Carter refused to acknowledge there was even an issue to debate in regard to 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal. He simply stated “we never had 
sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone…We had control of that zone, as though we 
had sovereignty, but we have recognized the sovereignty of Panama down through the 
years.” On October 14, 1977 President Carter and General Omar Torrijos of Panama 
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issued a Joint Statement of Understanding to clarify the terms of the new treaties 
concerned with sovereignty. In this statement, President Carter reaffirmed his belief that 
the U.S. should not interfere in the domestic affair of other nations. The statement 
explained that both Panama and the U.S. have a responsibility to insure the Panama Canal 
“will remain open and secure to ships of all nations.” The statement went on to specify 
that, “this does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as a right of intervention of the 
United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any United States action will be directed 
at insuring that the Canal will remain open, secure and accessible, and it shall never be 
directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of Panama.” The 
Panama Canal treaties reflected the Carter administration’s respect for the principle of 
sovereignty and clearly affirmed a policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
Panama as a matter of U.S. foreign policy.94 
Human Rights 
Interestingly enough, despite President Carter’s emphasis on human rights, he 
approached the Panama Canal treaties as entirely separate from human rights policy. 
Rather than argue the treaties would improve the human rights situation in Panama, the 
Carter administration emphasized the popularity of the Panama Canal treaties in Panama. 
President Carter chose to negotiate with General Torrijos despite human rights concerns 
because the president’s priority was taking responsibility for an improper American 
policy from the past. He subordinated his concern for potential human rights abuses to his 
                                                          94 Jimmy Carter, “Panama Canal Treaty Remarks During a Briefing on the Treaty,” August 30, 1977, APP, http://www.preisdency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8016. ; Letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance from Sol M. Linowitz, May 2, 1977.; Carter, “Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality.”  
67  
interest in remedying a serious injustice from the past. He also believed that new Panama 
Canal treaties would improve the human rights situation in Panama.95 
President Carter recognized that the Panama Canal treaties were congruous with 
his human rights policy. Secretary Vance explained that the administration had discussed 
their human rights concerns with Panama and hoped “closer relations between our two 
countries that will grow out of the new treaties will provide more positive context in 
which to express such concerns.” The administration also recognized the treaties 
corrected a past arrangement that exploited the rights of Panamanians by denying them 
complete political sovereignty. With the abolition of the Panama Canal Zone, they also 
allowed Panamanians to move more freely within their own country. The Carter 
administration believed the Panama Canal treaties would maintain the security of the 
canal, thus preventing violence and potentially protecting the lives of both Panamanians 
and Americans.96 
The president realized that problems in Panama were historical and systemic. 
Carter believed the new Panama treaties would correct these historical grievances 
focused and encourage institutional reforms that would protect human rights in Panama. 
The same month Torrijos signed the canal treaties he invited the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights to visit Panama and to report on human rights conditions. 
The Carter administration also noted that Panama’s economic plan specifically aimed to 
improve human rights. Despite the Panamanian government’s dubious record, President 
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Carter viewed the treaties a step toward promoting and protecting human rights in 
Panama.97 
International Cooperation and U.S. Leadership 
In 1926, the League of Nations was the first international organization to become 
involved an effort to “arbitrate the question of Panamanian sovereignty.” The United 
States, which never joined the League, opposed such efforts and announced that there 
was no issues to arbitrate between the U.S. and Panama. Harkening back to the historical 
precedent established with the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. stated it would not allow for 
any external influence whatsoever to interfere with its relations with the Republic of 
Panama. Despite past hostility towards international arbitration of a new canal treaty, 
President Carter hoped to use international organizations to promote cooperation and 
maintain peace throughout the world.98 
The Panamanian government had successfully internationalized the treaty issue in 
the early 1970s. Not only did Latin American leaders, support Panama’s demand for 
revisions to the 1903 treaty, countries throughout the world supported this small nation as 
well. In 1973, Panama, as a member of the U.N. Security Council, successfully lobbied 
for a Security Council meeting to take place in Panama. The United States, led at the time 
by President Richard Nixon, opposed such a meeting, citing concerns about increasing 
tensions in the region, and knowing that Panama would likely gain international 
sympathy for their treaty demands at such a meeting. The U.S. failed to convince other 
Security Council members to oppose a meeting outside of the United States. In the end, 
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the meeting was held, but at Panama’s expense, demonstrating just how committed 
Panama was to drawing international attention to the treaty issues and increasing pressure 
on the U.S. to negotiate new treaties. In an effort to limit international criticism, the U.S. 
took a huge step towards integrating the Panama Canal Zone into Panamanian territory. 
Before the meeting took place, the U.S took down the fences that separated the Canal 
Zone from Panama.99  
The Security Council meeting was regarded as a great success throughout 
Panama. Not only had it encouraged the U.S. to take down the physical barrier that 
divided the country, but Panama had also introduced a motion demanding revisions to the 
1903 treaty. The motion was supported by all Security Council members, except Great 
Britain, which abstained from the vote, and the United States. The United States used its 
veto for the third time in history to defeat the resolution. Despite its failure, Panamanian 
Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack viewed these results favorably. He concluded that 
“The United States has vetoed Panama’s resolution, but the world has vetoed the United 
States.” It appeared that the cause of Panama was becoming the cause of all mankind.100 
The Carter administration recognized the Panama Canal treaties were “the single 
most positive action to be undertaken in recent years in our relations with Latin 
America.” President Carter spoke of the treaties as symbolic of a new foreign policy 
direction in the region. On February 1, 1978, the President made a televised address to 
the American public about the importance of the Panama Canal treaties. Carter turned 
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once again to the past for inspiration. Carter quoted the same celebratory rhetoric Teddy 
Roosevelt had used when the Panama Canal was first opened, describing the treaty efforts 
as “the lift toward nobler things which marks a great and generous people.” The Carter 
administration was proud of the treaties, because they represented a foreign policy based 
on the moral principles of justice, fairness, and cooperation. They also demonstrated the 
administration’s preference for diplomatic negotiation as opposed to military coercion or 
covert action. Carter described how he felt a “new sense of equality, a new sense of trust 
and mutual respect that exists because of the Panama Canal treaties,” among Latin 
American nations.101 
The signing ceremony for the treaties was a lavish and celebratory affair.  
Representative from 27 American countries attended, including 19 heads of state. Those 
aware of the human right records of some of the Latin American dictators who were 
present at the signing did not celebrate this occasion as a positive example of 
international cooperation and American solidarity. While a few treaty opponents 
protested outside of the Pan American building on the night of the signing, an even larger 
group of protesters gathered to protest human rights abuses in the Chile and Uruguay. 
One critic likened the dictators of Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia who were present at 
the signing ceremony to “Franco, Hitler, and Stalin,” and described them as “the most 
motley collection of butchers ever assembled.” President Carter however met with each 
of the Latin American leaders, hoping to express the United States’ commitment to 
human rights and international cooperation.102 
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The Carter administration recognized the canal treaties were not simply a bilateral 
issue between the U.S. and Panama; Carter stressed that they were also of international 
importance since countries around the world utilized the Canal for shipping. The 
administration commented with pride that the canal “has been run as a public service for 
the nations of the world rather than a business,” for sixty-two years. The canal’s 
designated toll were set to sustain the canal’s operation rather make a profit. In fact, the 
toll rate only increased nine cents over the six decades before the 1977 treaty debate 
began. The Canal treaties were therefore important to the Carter administration, because 
they sought to internationalize its foreign policy and work to benefit the world as a 
whole.103 
Carter described how the “treaties will increase our Nation’s influence in this 
hemisphere, will help to reduce any mistrust and disagreement, and they will remove a 
major source of anti-American feeling.” Carter believed the old Panama treaty damaged 
the United States’ ability to act as a moral leader in Latin America and throughout the 
world. Again, the administration’s vision of U.S. moral leadership and the principle of 
honesty were reflected in the Panama Canal treaties. The treaties also certainly benefited 
the people of Panama by returning the canal to the people with sovereign rights to the 
land, and also maintaining peace. The treaties did away with the Panama Canal Zone, 
making the nation whole for the first time in its history. President Carter also stressed the 
importance of the canal remaining neutral so that all countries could benefit from trade 
through the waterway. 104 
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The U.S. sought to reestablish itself as an exemplary leader in the world rather 
than a colonial power. One treaty negotiator, Sol Linowitz, testified before the Senate 
Foreign Relations committee that “all countries of the hemisphere have made common 
cause in looking upon our position in the canal as the last vestige of a colonial past which 
evokes bitter memories and deep animosities.” Instead of overtly exploiting other 
countries, the Carter administration hoped to engage other countries through diplomatic 
efforts and promote American moral values throughout the world. William J. Jordan 
argues that the Panama Canal treaties demonstrated, “the way in which a great world 
power tried and succeeded in working out new arrangements for dealing with a small, 
nearby nation in an effort to maximize the benefits for both.” The treaties were an 
opportunity to revitalize American foreign policy by resolving problems from the past.105 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance echoed Sol Linowitz’s sentiments. The treaties 
“prove, once and for all, the falsity of the tired charges that we are imperialistic exploiters 
bent only on extracting Latin American raw materials and using the continent for our own 
economic interests.” The Carter administration saw the treaties as redemptive, an 
embodiment of the Carter administration’s moral policies. The president triumphantly 
declared that “the entire hemispheric interrelationship had been changed by my pursuit of 
human rights and by the symbolism of the Panama treaty.” The treaties represented a new 
direction in American foreign policy.106 
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Carter also believed the Panama treaties would convey U.S. values to other 
counties of the world. With the treaties, Carter planned to “demonstrate that as a large 
and powerful country, we are able to deal fairly and honorably with a proud but smaller 
sovereign nation.” Again stressing his respect for sovereignty, Carter hoped to 
deemphasize power relations and focus instead on developing mutually beneficial 
diplomatic relationships. He declared ratification of the treaties would “mark the 
beginning of a new era in our relations not only with Panama but with all the rest of the 
world. They symbolize our determination to deal with the developing nations of the 
world, the small nations of the world, on the basis of mutual respect and partnership.” 
The Panama Canal treaties allowed President Carter to successfully demonstrate to the 
world his belief that powerful counties should not exploit weaker nations; instead he felt 
they should assume leadership roles and promote human progress.107 
Promoting Peace 
Carter also believed the Panama Canal treaties were essential to maintaining 
peace and stability. President Carter’s Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan speculated that if 
the treaties failed it would “increase the likelihood of major incidents in Panama.” 
President Carter made it clear that if the treaties were not ratified he knew it would be his 
“responsibility to defend the canal against any such threat.” Publically, he worried if the 
treaties were not ratified “there might be some attempt to disrupt the canal.” He was 
conscientious of the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that it would take approximately 
100,000 U.S. troops to defend the canal and cautioned “if the canal treaties should be 
                                                          107Carter, “Address to the Nation on the Panama Canal Treaties.”; Jimmy Carter: “Panama Canal Treaties Remarks at the Signing Ceremony at the Pan American Union Building,” September 7, 1977, Papers of the President, 1977, Book II, 1543. 
74  
rejected by the Senate, it would be a severe blow…and under those circumstances I 
would probably have to take emergency action.” President Carter’s commitment to peace 
encouraged him to ardently promote the treaties to prevent potential violence. 108 
The potential for violence in Panama was quite real after a violent confrontation 
took place between Panamanians and Americans in 1964, which resulted in the death of 
twenty five people—four U.S. Army officers and 21 Panamanians.109 Because of this real 
threat of violence, the Carter administration viewed the successful negotiation of the 
treaties as “a triumph for the principle of the peaceful and constructive settlement of 
disputes between nations.” Rather than the use military force to achieve foreign policy 
objectives, diplomacy curbed potential violence and maintained peace, which Carter 
valued so highly. 110 
The administration also emphasized that representatives of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had worked with treaty negotiators to ensure the treaties were in the best interest of 
the U.S. militarily. Privately Carter wrote in his diary on the day of the Senate vote that 
he was “anticipating massive violence in Panama if the treaties were defeated.” The 
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threat to the canal was quite real to the president and he certainly dreaded the prospect of 
having to take military action in Panama.111 
While the Carter administration largely ignored accusations that the Torrijos 
regime was committing human rights abuses, the maintenance of peace was essential to 
preserving the human right to life. President Carter predicted an inevitable military 
engagement in Panama if the treaties were not ratified in the Senate. Such action would 
certainly cost both American and Panamanian lives. Acting to prevent such a conflict can 
therefore be construed as acting to protect human rights. In addition to preserving the 
peace, turning the Panama Canal over to Panamanians promoted their economic rights. 
Like his presidential predecessors, security concerns motivated the President Carter to 
support the Panama Canal treaties. These concerns cannot be separated from moral 
motivations because they so closely relate to preserving the peace. Upon signing the 
treaties Carter stated they “mark the commitment of the United States to the belief that 
fairness, and not force, should live at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the 
world.” The dual goals of peace the justice are again embodied within the Panama Canal 
treaty initiative.112   
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CHAPTER IV: 
OBSCURING A VISION: THE TREATY DEBATE 
The conservative opposition to the Panama Canal treaties reflected a worldview in 
sharp opposition to the Carter Administration’s foreign policy vision. The opposition 
framed the treaties as yet another American retreat. A newspaper editorial published in 
the Richmond News Leader bemoaned that “already America has met stalemate in Korea 
and debilitating defeat in Southeast Asia. Slowly, American has begun to retreat…Will 
the fall of the Panamanian domino signal yet another backward step?” Such allusion to 
the Domino Theory, demonstrated that the American public feared communism in 
Panama. The rhetoric of treaty opponents also often reflected such Cold War concerns.113 
Opponents of the Panama Canal treaties successfully obscured the Carter 
administration’s foreign policy vision, encouraging the administration to increasingly 
favor pragmatic arguments rather than moral justifications for the Panama Canal treaties. 
Passionate arguments opposing the Canal treaties challenged the president's credibility, 
dedication to moral ideals, and reputation as a strong and confident leader. Opponents 
successfully took advantage of the inherent contradictions within the Carter 
administration's human rights policy, and presented counter arguments that conflicted 
with each aspect of President Carter’s foreign policy vision. Like Carter, treaty opponents 
used historical arguments to support their position. The strength of the opposition and 
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administrative miscalculations resulted in the Carter administration failing to coherently 
communicate how the new treaties reflected the administration’s foreign policy vision. 
Arguments the administration put forth to support of the treaties were muddled as treaty 
opponents directly contradicted them with their own arguments. 
The Panama Canal issue had a decade-long history of opposition within the 
Senate when the Carter administration set out to negotiate new treaties. During the 1977 
ratification debate, congressional opponent made passionate arguments for the U.S. to 
keep indefinite control of the Panama Canal. A variety of conservative political 
organizations fought against the treaties, leading vigorous public campaigns aimed at 
halting their ratification. Some of these organizations were created to fight treaty 
ratification specifically, while others had operated for years and gained political 
momentum by adopting the treaty issue. The GOP also issued a statement opposing the 
treaties, as did conservative leader and former Governor of California Ronald Reagan. 
Scholars, including Adam Clymer and David Skidmore, have noted that the Panama 
Canal issue strengthened these “New Right” political groups. Despite the fact that they 
did not successfully stop the ratification of the treaties, they mobilized American 
conservatives against the treaties and the Carter administration that negotiated them.  
Historical Inspiration 
Historian George Moffett blamed ill timing and the power of public nostalgia for 
the fierce debate over the Panama treaties. Such an assessment suggests the Carter 
administration had little control over the results of the treaty debate, which seems to be 
far from the truth. President Carter and his administration were very involved in the 
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debate and campaign for Senate ratification of the treaties. They even adjusted the 
rhetoric they used to promote the treaties in an attempt to avoid opposition attacks.114   
Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee debated whether the history of the 
canal should be considered when deciding whether or not to ratify the new canal 
agreement. Senator Richard Clark [D-IA] remarked “I don’t think any nation can deny its 
past history or should want to.” He recognized that the new Panama treaties had historical 
inspiration and believed it was necessary to study the root of the canal dispute between 
the U.S. and Panama before deciding whether to ratify the treaties. History had certainly 
been President Carter’s first consideration when he considered negotiating new treaties. 
Senator Baker refused to let feelings of guilt influence his decision making and denied 
the significance of the past. He was adamant that he would not feel “ashamed of the 
Panama Canal,” and emphasized the “need to decide what is best for the country in the 
future, not what we did in the past.” Senator Hubert Humphrey argued that ratification of 
the Panama treaties would “add substance and character to the good neighbor policy first 
enunciated by President Roosevelt.” Humphrey saw the treaties as a continuation of past 
Latin American policy.115 
American treaty opponents summarized the history of the Panama Canal very 
succinctly as they shouted “We built it! We paid for it! We own it!” In regard to the first 
claim, certainly the U.S. had led the efforts to build the Panama Canal. Both President 
Carter and treaty opponents celebrated the construction of the canal. Unlike the president, 
opponents argued that since the U.S. was responsible for its construction, the country had 
                                                          114 Moffett, The Limits of Victory, 112. 
115 Panama Hearings, Part 1: 7, 9. 
79  
earned the right to indefinitely control it, just as the original 1903 treaty stipulated. Many 
Americans saw the canal as symbol of American strength and accomplishment.116   
Opponents also insisted “we paid for it!” stressing that not only did the U.S. pay 
an initial amount to Panama for construction rights and control of the Canal Zone, the 
U.S. also paid an annual annuity which had been incrementally increased over the years. 
Opponents also claimed that the U.S. had essential paid for the canal twice. The second 
payment, in the amount of $25 million was made to Colombia for violating the first 
agreement to construct a canal through the Colombian province of Panama.  
Treaty supporters and opponents both speculated about the future of the Panama 
Canal. During a January 1978 debate with William Buckley on Firing Line, Ronald 
Reagan drew a parallel between Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and Panama’s 
potential to nationalize the canal. In response to this concern, Secretary Vance simply 
argued that the treaties reduced the risk of Panama nationalizing the Canal. He 
dramatically speculated during a Foreign Relations Committee hearing in the Senate that 
if the treaties were to fail, “our relations with Panama would be shattered, our standing in 
Latin America damaged immeasurably, and the security of the canal itself placed in 
jeopardy.” Opponents and supporters of the treaties made historical assumptions and 
future predictions in an effort to support their arguments.117 
The Carter administration started to increasingly favor pragmatic arguments as the 
Senate vote to ratify the treaties approached. The administration likely recognized that 
moral arguments could inspire a disquieting sense of shame, at a time when the public 
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was already wary of dubious foreign policy and the declining strength of the U.S. in the 
world following the Vietnam War. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Cyrus Vance stated that the primary reason to ratify the treaties was because 
“these treaties protect and advance the national interests of both the United States and 
Panama.” While concern for the national interests of a developing nation reflected an 
international broad foreign policy, Vance did not specifically mention the historical 
inspiration for new treaties. He simply stated the new treaties should be ratified “because 
of the responsible way they resolve complex and emotional issues which have been with 
us for most of this century.” This vague allusion to the historical inspiration for the canal 
treaties exemplifies the Carter administrations shift in tactics. When the treaties were 
signed in September of 1977, President Carter emphasized moral arguments much more 
than his administration did in the months leading up to the Senate vote in spring of 1978. 
Democratic Ideals 
Treaty opponents challenged President Carter’s democratic values, criticizing the 
fact that Carter negotiated with a Panamanian dictator. General Torrijos seized power in 
Panama in 1967 in a military coup. Despite his authoritarian leadership style, President 
Carter offered a positive assessment of Torrijos’ character. He wrote in his diary that he 
was largely impressed with the Panamanian leader. President Carter’s willingness to 
negotiate with a dictator encouraged opponents to challenge his commitment to 
democracy. Conservative opponents often suggested Torrijos and Carter were 
coconspirators in a Cold War narrative.118 
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81  
The Carter administration was unable to acknowledge concern over Torrijos’ 
governing style because such criticism would certainly have created backlash in Panama. 
Since the president could not justify his decision to negotiate and meet with undemocratic 
leaders, the administration simply ignored this criticism, thus inspiring even more 
speculation about his values and doubts about the coherency of his human rights policies. 
In reality, Carter had many moral reasons to pursue negotiations, even if he had to do so 
with a repressive regime. During his presidential campaign he had discussed this very 
topic in a NBC news interview. When asked about the “morality of liaisons with 
dictatorships,” Carter once reflected upon his religious convictions to explain his 
perspective. “God says, ‘judge not, that ye be not judged’ [Matthew 7:1]. Just because I 
believe in democracy it doesn’t mean I think that people who live in countries that might 
have a different form of government…are wrong.” Carter also cited the golden rule and 
explained that “what’s best for those people who live in the country with which we are 
dealing?” should be a primary consideration. President Carter proved he was willing to 
negotiate with a dictator to purse a new canal agreement that aligned with his moral 
principles, but he could not justify this position to the American public.119 
President Carter also believed that the Panama Canal treaties would promote 
democracy in Panama. Carter observed that many improvements were made even before 
the treaties were ratified. People were granted more political freedom, and were able to 
participate in a national plebiscite to demonstrate whether they supported the new canal 
treaties. According to Freedom House, many of the restrictions on the Panamanian media 
were lifted once the treaties were signed. The two United Nations human rights covenants 
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that President Carter had signed were also ratified in Panama in 1977. The U.S. Senate 
did not ratify them until 1992. While President Carter likely disapproved of the 
authoritarian nature of the Torrijos regime, Carter felt it was more important for a 
democratic country to act according to its own values, than refuse to negotiate with a 
particular type of government. Carter believed signing the treaties had expanded freedom 
in Panama, and he felt ratification of the treaties would continue this trend.120 
Opponents criticized the Carter administration for its appointment of Sol Linowitz 
to the treaty negotiating team. President Carter, in an effort to promote expediency, 
appointed him as a special negotiator. Since his term of service was limited to six 
months, his appointment did not require congressional approval. Opponents accused the 
president of attempting to dodge Congress rather than cooperate with the legislative 
branch. They insinuated that President Carter’s actions revealed he was hiding something 
about Linowitz’s appointment and suggested that Linowitz was motivated by his own 
business interests in Panama. In an attempt to quell such accusations, Linowtiz stepped 
down from his position as. This decision only fueled opposition claims that Linowtiz had 
conflicting interests and should not have negotiated the new canal treaties with 
Panama.121 
Treaty opponents were critical of the Carter administration’s decision to pursue 
Senate ratification of the Canal treaties because they argued that the public 
overwhelmingly opposed the treaties. Secretary of State Vance described how the 
administration felt it was “on the threshold of an important period in American 
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diplomacy,” because the president had the “confidence and support of the American 
people.” Such support, especially when considering the Panama Canal treaties, seems to 
have been illusionary. David Skidmore discusses the widespread unreliability of public 
opinion polls on the treaties, and concluded a majority of Americans opposed the treaties. 
Bernard Rochco’s study of the same topic indicated that public opinion poll results varied 
dramatically depending on the wording of questions. He estimated for every five 
Americans who opposed the treaties, only three supported them. The Carter 
administration believed they “were quite successful,” changing public opinion. Carter’s 
argument that public support had shifted in favor of the treaties may have even convinced 
some undecided senators to vote for ratification of the treaties.122 
Treaty opponents also challenged the Carter administration’s claim that the 
treaties were just. They voiced concerns Zonians in particular, whose lives would 
undoubtedly change once there was no longer a Canal Zone in Panama. The Zonians 
however were guaranteed their jobs through retirement, hence the importance of the 
interim period before turning the canal over to Panama. Opponents also voiced concern 
about whether Panamanians were capable of successfully running the canal operations. 
The Carter administration sought to quell such jingoistic, if not blatantly racist 
sentiments. Ellsworth Bunker guaranteed it was “possible to build up a fully qualified 
Panamanian workforce,” before transferring the canal to Panamanian control at the end of 
the century. Bunker was careful not to insult the Panamanian people, noting that in 1977 
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seventy-four percent of canal employees were Panamanian. He recognized that “we of 
course start from a strong base,” of Panamanian workers ready to operate the canal.123 
Honesty and Transparency 
There was a lot of finger-pointing on both sides of the treaty issue, when it came 
to the truthfulness of debate arguments. One of the most prominent public supporters of 
the treaties outside of politics was John Wayne. He wrote a letter to Ronald Reagan, 
offering to show him “point-by-God-damn-point in the Treaty where you are 
misinforming people.” This amount of outrage was common on both sides of the treaty 
debate and likely created confusion among American public, who certainly had less 
access to information about the treaties than the politicians involved in the debate in 
Washington.124  
Senate opponents also blatantly challenged the president’s commitment to 
honesty. In October of 1977, less than a month after Carter signed the canal treaties, 
Senator Robert Dole [R., Kan.] publically leaked a classified document related to treaty 
negotiations. The leaked cable from Panama raised questions about the United States’ 
right to permanently defend the canal. Panama wanted reassurances that this permanent 
defense agreement would not infringe on the political independence and sovereignty of 
the country, pointing out “intervention is simply forbidden by international law.” Senator 
Dole, despite being faced with an ethics violation for the leak, suggested Panama’s 
position was threatening. He compared his revelation to a recent historical example of 
government deceit. “We should have learned from Watergate that we can never again 
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allow a ‘national security’ classification to be used in such a way as to mislead the 
American people,” Dole bemoaned. The leaked Panama cable allowed opponents to 
publically question the Carter administration’s commitment to honesty and was impetus 
for the aforementioned Joint Statement of Clarification, signed by both Carter and 
Torrijos. The agreement reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to not interfere in the internal 
affairs of Panama in an effort to defend the canal. The leak may also have damaged the 
president’s credibility and his ability to effectively make moral arguments to support 
ratification of the Panama treaties.125    
 Treaty opponents also argued about the strategic and economic importance of the 
Panama Canal. President Carter pointed out that many military vessels and even some 
tankers were too large to pass through the canal, thus the canals importance was in 
decline. The president considered constructing a sea-level canal was a potential option in 
the future, and emphasized that the treaties included provisions that protected U.S. 
interests in such a construction project in Panama. Alternatively, treaty opponents 
emphasized that controlling the Panama Canal was absolutely vital to U.S. interests.  
Members of the U.S. Senate noted the contradictions in political commentary 
about the treaties. Senator John Glenn [D-OH] remarked “I think in the mail and the 
media, there have been more conflicting statements about Panama, and more conflicting 
views expressed as to what this treaty does than anything I have seen recently." The 
public was likely confused by such contradictory arguments. Senator Richard Stone [D-
FL] was critical of the “battle of the propaganda on both sides,” of the treaty debate. 
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Conflicting information called into question the honesty of those on both sides of the 
debate.126 
Opponents to the Panama Canal treaties raised many doubts about the Carter 
administration’s honesty. This was a serious problem for a president who had pledged 
time and time again to never lie to the American people. The Carter administration often 
dismissed opposition arguments, ignoring them altogether or claiming they were 
misinformed. They also accused treaty opponents of being deceitful. Such contradictory 
arguments left the public confused about the real goals and terms of the Panama Canal 
treaties. It was quite difficult for the public to know who to believe.  
The Question of Sovereignty 
When American treaty opponents protested the Canal Treaties, they also 
proclaimed “We own it!” The debate over sovereignty appeared to be an irreconcilable 
conflict. Both sides of the debate refused to acknowledge the premise of their opponent’s 
arguments. Those who objected to the new Panama treaties, including Ronald Reagan, 
argued the Canal Zone was “sovereign American territory, every bit the same as Alaska 
and all the states that were carved out of the Louisiana Purchase.”  In contrast, supporters 
of the treaties summarily dismissed claims that the Canal Zone had the same territorial 
status as an American state. Such a response may have even encouraged discontent with 
the Carter administration’s Panama Canal policy, as nobody welcomes being labeled 
uninformed. By simply claiming the U.S. never had sovereign rights within the Canal 
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Zone, President Carter lost an opportunity to clarify its position that the U.S. should and 
would be respecting sovereignty of other countries, including developing countries.127 
The Chairman of the American Conservative Union, Representative Philip Crane 
[R-IL], authored a book opposing the treaties, entitled Surrender in Panama. This book, 
along with millions of mass mailings sent out by Crane’s organization and other 
conservative anti-treaty groups increased public opposition to the treaties. These groups 
successfully organized grassroots campaigns against the treaties, encouraging Americans 
to write to their Senators to voice their concerns. The American Conservative Union also 
aired a television program which argued emphatically about sovereignty, claiming that 
“There is no Panama Canal. There is an American Canal at Panama.” Opposition claims 
continued to conflict dramatically with the arguments the Carter administration 
championed.128 
Treaty opponents may have been misinformed about the legal distinctions 
between the Zone and U.S. territory, but they certainly did recognize that the U.S. had 
acted as if it were sovereign in the Panama Canal Zone for a majority of the twentieth 
century. While the Carter administration recognized a neocolonial relationship between 
the U.S. and Panama existed, they chose not to argue this point. Perhaps the Carter 
administration thought the U.S. Congress and the American public were not willing to 
confront this history of exploitation. President Carter may have been ill advised in 
dismissing popular and poignant arguments against the treaties. The original treaty did 
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indeed state that the U.S. retained “all rights, power and authority within the zone 
mentioned…which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign 
of the territory…to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any 
sovereign rights, power or authority.” Carter’s argument that the U.S. did not have 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone seemed to be incongruent with decades of political 
reality.129  
It was not only President Carter and his administration who thought arguments of 
treaty opponents reflected ignorance. Senators were also critical about the apparent lack 
of public knowledge about the treaties. Senator Claiborne Pell [D-RI] hoped the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearings would “gradually turn around this public 
opinion.” In reference to the mass amounts of mail he and other senators received in 
opposition to the treaties, he doubted “if anybody who sent us a post card has read the full 
text of the treaty.” Such doubts suggest that treaty supporters, including Senator Pell and 
President Carter, simply believed that with the proper information everyone would 
logically support the treaties. Assumptions such as these encouraged treaty supporters to 
dismiss opposition arguments as the ramblings of uninformed reactionaries.130 
The question of sovereignty became a heated issue when the Senate debated the 
DeConcini Reservation. This amendment implied the U.S. had the authority to use force 
within Panama if there were internal threats to the canal. The amendment raise questions 
about the United States’ respect for Panamanian sovereignty, and caused a great deal of 
outrage in Panama. The Carter administration had to take action to ease tensions. First, 
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President Carter recognized the amendment was “a violation of my agreement with 
Torrijos,”and urged the Senate to reject it. When it was approved as part of the Neutrality 
Treaty, Carter concluded “the Panamanians need a restatement of the principle of non-
intervention.” He worked with Senate leaders who agreed the Panama Canal Treaty 
would include an amendment affirming U.S. respect for Panamanian sovereignty using 
the same wording of the Joint Statement of Understanding Carter had made with Torrijos 
had used. Carter clarified that the U.S. did “not have the right to interfere in Panama’s 
internal affairs. That is a right we neither possess nor desire.” President Carter made the 
position of restraint and respect for sovereignty public and clear with the Panama Canal 
treaties.131 
The Human Rights Contradiction 
Ironically, conservative opponents claimed the human rights cause as their own in 
an effort to gain supporters and successfully block treaty ratification. In an effort to 
mobilize more citizens against the new canal agreement, conservatives emphasized 
human rights concerns in Panama. Many Americans who supported the Carter 
administrations human rights efforts were already alarmed that Carter had met with 
Augusto Pinochet in September 1977, when the Chilean dictator attended the Panama 
Canal treaty signing ceremony. This meeting had resulted in international observers 
gaining access to Chile, but it appeared quite hypocritical to critics of Chile’s repressive 
military dictatorship.  One protestor complained that the Carter “administration is all lip, 
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all words.” Liberals were certainly critical of Carter’s human rights record. Because the 
administration favored increasingly pragmatic arguments to promote the treaties, the 
public had little reason to view the Panama Canal treaties as consistent with Carter’s 
moral foreign policy. The Carter administration appeared to have abandoned the idealistic 
foreign policy vision President Carter had described during his inaugural address.132 
Treaty opponents championed “human rights” concerns in Panama, adopting one 
of the most fundamental aspects of the Carter administration’s foreign policy as their 
own. They publicized testimony heard before the Senate of a Panamanian widow whose 
husband, Leopoldo Aragon, was illegally detained by the Panamanian government. Upon 
his release, he fled to Sweden where he protested the Panama Canal treaties in front of 
the U.S. embassy by self-immolation. Opponents drew attention to this extreme form of 
protest and the human rights abuses that inspired it. In doing so they also challenged the 
Carter administration’s commitment to its stated moral principles.133 
Anti-treaty activists accused the Torrijos government of committing human rights 
abuses. They voiced concern that Carter’s decision to negotiate with a dictator gave his 
government legitimacy. Treaty opponents also worried about the stability of the Torrijos 
regime and whether the treaties would be successfully enforced in Panama. Such 
hypothetical concerns were difficult to address. There was also a lack of credible 
information about the extent of human rights violations in Panama. It was clear that 
Torrijos’ regime was responsible for limiting freedom in Panama. When Torrijos seized 
power in Panama, a new constitution was drafted to give him ultimate authority within 
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government. When the Carter administration attempted to sell the Panama Canal treaties 
to the American public, they avoided the topic of human rights altogether. In fact 
President Carter’s assessment of Torrijos was largely positive. Carter described him as 
charismatic leader. Such praise and respect, conflicted with treaty opponent’s claims that 
Torrijos was “a little tinhorn dictator.”134 
President Carter claimed the U.S. “cannot look away when a government tortures 
people, or jails them for their beliefs.” Yet the Torrijos government was responsible for 
such human rights violations and the Carter administration did not acknowledge them. 
Opponents to the treaties made the public question Carter’s commitment to human rights, 
and perhaps even more damaging, his pledge to be honest with the American public and 
include them in the democratic process. The Carter administration had braced for such 
attacks in regard to their human rights policy. The Presidential Review Memorandum 
issued in early July 1977 studied human rights policies and concluded “potentially 
unavoidable inconsistencies, particularly in the public eye, will expose us to severe 
criticism.” Knowing this, President Carter continued to pursue the Panama Canal treaties 
because he ultimately believed they were consistent with his goals and values.135 
It is unclear what knowledge the Carter administration had regarding human 
rights abuses in Panama. The OAS carried out an investigation to determine the 
prevalence of abuse, but its report was not complete until after the canal treaties were 
ratified. The report concluded that the Panamanian government was responsible for 
thirty-four extrajudicial deaths during the years Torrijos was in power. The OAS reported 
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the government had also illegally detained and the tortured prisoners. The report did 
indicate that the frequency of such abuses declined from when Torrijos first came to 
power in 1968 to 1977, when the Panama treaties were signed.136 
Opponents encouraged the public to question the president’s commitment human 
rights. Such contradictory arguments successfully convoluted the president’s foreign 
policy vision. The Carter administration explained their human rights policy “approach 
was to be determined, principled, firm, and flexible,” for instance. The two later 
characteristics appear to be in conflict. What exactly did the Carter administration mean 
by designing a policy that was both “firm and flexible”? It meant that they planned to be 
firm about their principles, yet flexible enough to respond appropriately to “constraints 
and opportunities,” associated with foreign policy decision making. The administration 
recognized that human right policy was inherently complex and often presented 
contradictions. The administration contributed to this lack of clarity when they shifted 
away from making moral arguments in support of the Panama Canal treaties to making 
more pragmatic ones that emphasized the importance of security and the interests of the 
United States. While the pragmatic shift was meant to encourage Senate ratification of 
the treaties, it hindered the Carter administration’s ability to communication its foreign 
policy principles.137   
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137 Vance, Hard Choices, 44,442. 
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International Relations and U.S. Security 
Rather than accepting the Carter administration’s premise that the treaties would 
improve international relations and allow the U.S. to once again take on a leadership role 
within the global community, treaty opponents argued that an external communist threat 
was a real concern in Panama. Exploiting Cold War fears, opponents described a “Soviet-
Cuban-Panamanian alliance,” and labelled Torrijos a Marxist. What anti-treaty 
conservatives did not know, was that the Communist Party in Panama had been created 
and run by the CIA in an effort to infiltrate Moscow.138  
Whether or not the U.S. was negotiating from a position of power was also a 
controversial debate point. Opponents argued the Panama Canal treaties represented “a 
giveaway” of the Panama Canal. In fact, the most ardent opponent of the treaties in the 
Senate, Sen. Strom Thurmond claimed the treaties allowed for “the greatest give-away 
since God gave man the world for his dominion.” Republican Senator Jesse Helms of 
North Carolina argued that the treaties reflected American weakness, “which could 
literally destroy America.” Such arguments were designed to inspire fear. Treaty 
opponents exploited American insecurities borne out of the American military defeat in 
Vietnam, to encourage public opposition to the treaties.139  
Conservative opponents viewed foreign policy using a Cold War paradigm, which 
reflected much different values than the Carter administration’s foreign policy vision. 
While the president sought to increase international cooperation in an effort to take on a 
leadership role within the world, opponents argued that the treaties would threaten the 
                                                          138 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 321. 
139 Strom Thurmond quoted in Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America, (New York: , ): 260.  
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prestige of the U.S. internationally, which would create a security risk. Conservatives 
valued maintaining a favorable balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, a goal that 
they believed would fail if the U.S. were to “giveaway” the Panama Canal. To 
conservative treaty opponents, the canal represented, not only American might, but also a 
strategic and tactical military asset. Treaty opponents argued the Panama treaties 
threatened American security, while President Carter viewed the treaties as essential to 
protecting American security interests and avoiding violence in Panama. Certainly both 
perspectives could not be correct. 
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CHAPTER V: 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the Carter administration’s campaign to ratify the Panama Canal treaties 
was a success. The treaties were ratified by a single vote in the Senate and the Panama 
Canal was turned over to Panamanian control on the eve of the twenty-first century. 
Since, an expansion of the canal has been completed and the canal continues to be open 
to ships of all nations. Unfortunately, it is difficult to judge the success of President 
Carter’s step towards greater international cooperation. Cyrus Vance blamed “structural 
and human constraints” for the Carter administration’s unfulfilled vision. Perhaps if 
President Carter had not believed so ardently in the goodness and altruism of the 
American public, he could have anticipated some of these constraints and made greater 
efforts to counteract them.140 
The Carter administration developed a coherent foreign policy vision based upon 
moral and political values. President Carter chose to pursue negotiation and Senate 
ratification of the Panama Canal treaties because the treaties aligned closely with his 
vision of international cooperation and justice in his pursuit of lasting global peace. 
Studying the Carter administration’s foreign policy demonstrates the importance and 
power of historical argumentation and the diverse perspectives of public policy issues.   
                                                          140 Vance, Hard Choices, 13.  
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The treaty debate demonstrated how policymakers reflect on history during their 
decision-making process and may even manipulate it to support their own political 
agenda.  President Carter’s understanding of history inspired him to pursue the Panama 
treaties. The president demonstrated an ability to learn from the past in an effort to 
correct an injustice. Even before he was elected president, Carter voiced his hope that 
“the lessons we have learned can be a basis for dramatic improvements in the prospects 
for world peace.” The president believed human progress evolved consistently over time. 
He therefore sought to move forward by promoting positive change, which he believed 
demanded a greater respect for human rights and the maintenance of peace.141 
Both President Carter and treaty opponents also made nostalgic arguments about 
the great American achievement of constructing the Panama Canal. Such arguments 
encouraged some patriotic Americans to insist upon the U.S. retaining control of the 
canal, whereas treaty proponents argued ratifying the treaties was the best way to protect 
the canal so the United States and countries of the world could continue using it. In the 
past the canal has also both benefitted and exploited the Panamanian people.  One benefit 
Panamanian’s received from their strained relationship with the U.S., was the backing of 
their independence. Once the canal was constructed, the benefits of the canal were not 
equally or equitably distributed between the U.S. and Panama.  
Another historical argument focused on sovereignty. The Panama Canal either 
was or was not sovereign U.S. territory. Treaty opponents who argued that it was, 
misinterpreted the history of the original treaty agreement with Panama, yet their 
arguments in the public debate over the treaties were still powerful. The treaty debate 
                                                          141 Carter, New Approach to Foreign Policy, May 28, 1975, 4. 
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demonstrates the political power of disinformation. It is important to recognize that even 
inaccurate statements can be political powerful and popular. 
The Carter administration noted that “the lessons we draw from recent history is 
that public understanding and support are now vital to a successful foreign policy.” 
Despite this knowledge, the Carter administration failed to communicate the tenets of its 
morally inspired foreign policy vision. President Carter’s foreign policy vision was never 
fulfilled. The president was unable to win public support for the Panama Canal treaties or 
many of his subsequent foreign policy initiatives. While an understanding history can aid 
in political decision-making, it certainly cannot predict the future. President Carter 
successfully developed a coherent foreign policy vision, but he was not able to 
consistently and effectively communicate his vision. The case of the Panama Canal 
treaties demonstrates that the Carter administration made politically pragmatic arguments 
in an effort to support the treaties, but in doing so also obscured its overarching vision. 
By choosing to frame the Panama Canal treaties pragmatically the Carter administration 
avoided inherent contradictions related to human rights policy. At the same time, 
choosing not to emphasize the moral foundations of its foreign policy may have raised 
doubts about the administration’s commitment to these moral principles.142 
Overall, President Carter’s foreign policy differed greatly from the Cold War 
policy of his predecessors. Both polices however reflect elements of American 
exceptionalism. President Carter believed that the U.S. was uniquely qualified to provide 
moral leadership in an international system. He had faith that the American people would 
act morally an in accordance with American principles. In President Carter’s 1978 State 
                                                          142 Carter, New Approach to Foreign Policy, May 28, 1975, 17, 4. 
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of the Union Address, he spoke of such leadership stating, “we have placed American 
foreign policy on a new course consistent with the values and highest ideals of the 
American people.” President Carter also believed the U.S. had a unique responsibility to 
take on a leadership role in the world. He explained that “no other country is as well-
qualified as we to set an example,” to countries around the world. He even believed the 
U.S. had “a special obligation to take on those moral duties which, when assumed, seem 
invariably to be in our own best interests.” Despite the dramatic differences between Cold 
War policy and Carter’s internationalized foreign policy, both reflect elements of 
American exceptionalism. While treaty opponents believed the U.S. was exceptionally 
capable of operating the canal, President Carter believed Americans were exceptionally 
ethical and would come to understand that turning the canal over to Panama was a moral 
imperative.143 
The Panama Canal treaties also demonstrate that bipartisanship on an incredibly 
controversial issue is possible.  While politics have become increasingly polarized in the 
decades since the Panama Canal treaties were ratified, the successful ratification of the 
treaties inspire hope that politicians, such as Senator Howard Baker, Senator Frank 
Church, and President Jimmy Carter, can choose to support moral policies, despite 
potential political repercussions. While the Panama Canal treaties were not the only 
political issue that damaged future political prospects for these men, the issue was one 
where politicians were asked to do what was right rather than what was politically 
                                                          143 Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address,” January 19, 1978, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30867.; Jimmy Carter: "University of Notre Dame - Address at Commencement Exercises at the University," May 22, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, APP. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ ?pid=7552.; Jimmy Carter: “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1977, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6575. 
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expedient. President Carter only served one term as president, and scholars continue to 
criticize his effectiveness as a leader. Perhaps the example he set in campaigning for the 
ratification of the Panama Canal treaties may inspire future leaders to adhere to their 
principles rather than give in to public demands inspired by misinformation, self-interest, 
and fear.  
While not often associated with President Carter’s human rights policy, the 
Panama Canal treaties were congruous with the president’s desire to protect these 
fundamental rights. The treaties demonstrate that many foreign policy issues can 
ultimately promote human rights. The need to protect these rights through cooperation, 
diplomacy, and the maintenance of peace is no less important today than it was during the 
canal debate. The canal treaties reflected a mutually beneficial solution to a problem that 
would promote human rights by providing economic benefits to Panama and setting a 
precedent for a cooperative relationships between a wealthy developed country and 
smaller developing one. The treaties have also successfully maintained the neutrality of 
the Panama Canal—demonstrating that the benefits of the treaties were truly global.  
The Panama treaties also demonstrate the challenges of making moral political 
arguments. Since policy requires the consideration of a multitude of complex factors, 
including security, it is easy for the politicians to favor pragmatic arguments that may 
provide more immediate and measurable benefits than acting according to principle 
alone. An informed electorate that can make sound judgements even when presented with 
conflicting and emotional arguments is essential to developing productive democratic 
policies ideally reflect political values. 
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Finally, recent history helps us understand President Carter’s commitment to 
promoting peace. In a 2011 interview at the John F. Kennedy presidential library, he 
spoke of how proud he was that during his time as president the U.S. “never went to war. 
We never dropped a bomb. We never fired a bullet.” President Carter judges his foreign 
policy success based on his ability to maintain peace. Carter’s efforts were recognized in 
2002 when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for his decades of untiring effort to 
find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human 
rights, and to promote economic and social development.” In the years following his 
presidency, Carter remained committed to his vision’s ultimate goal.144 
The Panama Canal treaties were a policy initiative that clearly reflected the moral 
principles of President Carter’s foreign policy and demonstrated the president’s desire for 
the U.S. to take on a leadership role to establish a peaceful and just international system. 
The Panama Canal policy was aligned with the Carter’s foreign policy principles of 
honesty, respect for sovereignty, peaceful international cooperation, and justice. While 
negotiating the treaties with a dictatorial regime seemed to contradict his emphasis on 
human rights, his desire to prevent potentially life-threatening conflict demonstrated his 
concern for the most vital of human rights. Overall, President Carter used the Panama 
Canal treaties to assert U.S. moral leadership within the international system and build 
stronger relationships with Latin American countries. The president pursued the Panama 
Canal treaties because he believed they allowed the U.S. to take on a role as a moral 
leader, correcting an unjust policy of the past and working cooperatively to establish an 
                                                          144 Quoted in Carol Cadwalladr “Jimmy Carter: ‘We never dropped a bomb. We never fired a bullet. We never went to war.’” The Observer, September 10, 2011.; “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2002 to Jimmy Carter—Press Release,” Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014.  
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honest and fair agreement. Ratification of the treaties proved that “what is best and 
noblest in our national spirit will prevail,” just as President Carter thought it would. In the 
future, we must demand that international leaders continue to work for the most 
fundamental facets of the Carter administration’s foreign policy vision: the promotion of 
peace and respect for human rights throughout the world.145 
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